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ABSTRACT
When the United States offered Ireland the opportunity to join the European
Recovery Plan (ERP) after World War II, Irish officials and leaders had a unique
opportunity to move beyond Ireland’s conservative political and economic isolation
and, with ERP resources, to work towards European integration. However, extreme
nationalism and the issue of the partition of Northern Ireland impeded even the most
forward thinking Irish leaders of the time, like Seán MacBride, from fully realizing the
opportunity of ERP because these leaders hijacked Marshall Plan propaganda for the
purpose of promoting their own political, nationalistic agenda. Even strong proponents
of European recovery and European integration, like the Irish intellectual Sean
O’Faolain, were not immune to the pull of Irish nationalism. O’Faolain’s 1951
Marshall Plan film The Promise of Barty O’Brien provides an historical and cultural
lens into Ireland’s struggle between modernization and extreme Irish nationalism,
which was often isolationist and fervently against the partition of Northern Ireland.
Despite O’Faolain’s support of ERP, modernization, and integration, the film
demonstrates a glorification of Ireland’s agrarian and revolutionary past. Extreme Irish
nationalism, the failure to break economic ties to the United Kingdom, and demands
that anti-partition be a condition of membership in NATO alienated both U.S. and
European officials. This thesis will expand and contribute to the existing scholarship on
the ERP and Irish nationalism in the post World War II era because of the analysis of
diplomatic affairs in connection with unique and significant Marshall Plan films like
The Promise of Barty O’Brien.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

During the period of the Marshall Plan, Ireland was paradoxically both
peripheral and central to the success of European integration and economic recovery
after World War II. The country was still producing agriculture for an economically
devastated United Kingdom and the export of Irish foodstuffs were essential for
sustaining the wellbeing of both nations. The complex relationships between the United
Kingdom and Ireland reveal the paradox of British dependence on Ireland’s economy.
Despite political autonomy from the British Commonwealth, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom were codependent in their reliance on the Sterling area and bi-lateral trade.
The scholarship of this thesis will contribute to the growing body of contemporary
research on individual European countries involved in the European Recovery Plan
(ERP). Specifically, this thesis demonstrates how Ireland’s foreign affairs’ leaders
manipulated ERP propaganda for the purpose of promoting their own political agenda.
Although scholarship about ERP propaganda is quite diverse, this thesis will focus on
specific media in Ireland that used ERP resources for promoting Irish nationalism.
Tension among the Irish people, the British, and the Americans complicated the postwar
recovery of Ireland, but the struggle among the Irish actually delayed Ireland’s entrance
into the European community in the immediate postwar era. This thesis will
demonstrate that, despite Irish nationalism and resistance to outside cultural, political
and economic influence, many Irish officials actively courted external political, and
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cultural influences, but Ireland ultimately failed to realize the opportunity of ERP
because Irish leaders used ERP propaganda to implement their own nationalistic
propaganda to call attention to partition.
Irish nationalism and the problem of the partition of the northern counties of
Ireland transected all aspects of Irish life—religious, political, economic, and
diplomatic. The Parliament of the United Kingdom gave Ireland home rule when it
passed the Government of Ireland Act in 1920. The entire island of Ireland became the
Irish Free State in 1922. However, the parliament of Northern Ireland decided to optout (Article 12 of the treaty allowed for an opt-out) of the Irish Free State. The six
counties in the north eventually became Northern Ireland under the sovereignty of the
United Kingdom. The Irish Free State accepted this provision of partition as temporary.
The declaration of Ireland as a republic in 1948 widened the effect of partition because
of Ireland’s neutrality and non-participation in NATO. Irish External Affairs leader
Seán MacBride’s strong stance against partition often caused friction with U.S.
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) members who believed it was a
distraction from ERP and European cooperation.
In 1951, the fictional feature-length film The Promise of Barty O’Brien was
released and screened in Ireland. The film tells the story of Barty O’Brien who wanted
to leave his farm to train as an electrical engineer but was prevented from fulfilling his
dream by his father who embodied a rural, nationalist, anti-modern viewpoint. Barty
fulfills his dream despite his father’s obstinacy by participating in the ERP Technical
Assistance Program. Barty O’Brien’s journey is in many ways a metaphor for the
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desire of the Irish people to modernize in the postwar era while retaining the traditional,
agricultural legacy of their history. The film addresses the key political, economic, and
social themes affecting Ireland at the time, particularly the issue of modernization with
regard to the Technical Assistance Program implemented by the ERP. Despite
propaganda and modernization efforts, Ireland failed to fulfill the goals of
industrialization in the immediate years after World War II. Technical Assistance aid
was suspended in 1952, and ECA officials were unimpressed by the political
grandstanding of Irish leaders like Seán MacBride. The film is important, though,
because Barty’s plight was representative of the tension present in Ireland’s quest for
identity after independence in the modern age of the ERP (or Marshall Plan).1 The film
is a lens into the Irish experience of ERP and Barty’s struggle is a metaphor for the Irish
people’s struggle between traditional values and modernizing Ireland. Barty O’Brien,
like Irish officials of the day, was torn between fulfilling his role as farmer and
becoming a modern electrical engineer by participating in the American ERP Technical
Assistance Program. Like Barty, Irish officials were conflicted between clinging to the
traditional agricultural, economic isolation of Ireland’s past and interacting with and
accepting foreign economic and cultural resources.
The chapters of the thesis are organized by topics that illustrate not only the
background of the ERP and Ireland, but also the complex relationships involved in the
push for modernization and integration. The initial chapter focuses on the background
of the ERP and Ireland, including the historiography concerning the Marshall Plan in
1

I will use the terms “ERP,” “European Recovery Plan”, and “Marshall Plan”
interchangeably throughout the thesis.
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general and Ireland, specifically. Historiography concerning Irish nationalism is
explored in the second chapter. Traditionally, scholarship on the European Recovery
Program involved the complicated bilateral relationship between the European nations
and the United States, particularly in the context of the Cold War. Only recently have
scholars begun to explore the ERP in a wider, more nuanced context, involving not only
Cold War politics, but inter-European relations as well. Attention is now being paid to
the smaller nations—particularly Ireland. Ireland is significant in the context of the
Marshall Plan and the post World War II era for several reasons. First of all, Ireland
was a neutral nation during World War II. This exacerbated an already complex
relationship with the United Kingdom after the war. In 1948, Ireland was officially
declared a republic, thus terminating the identity of the nation in relation to its
connection with the British Commonwealth. However, Ireland continued to be
dependent on Britain economically. After the declaration of the republic, the partition
of Northern Ireland was solidified. Partition became an important issue for the Irish not
only because they believed a part of Ireland was taken from them, but also because they
lost the industrialized, prosperous north to the British.
In the first chapter, I will explore the background on the ERP and Ireland and
focus on the historiography of the subject. I will trace the scholarship of the Marshall
Plan from its original focus on the achievements of the plan to the revisionist theory that
the United States was simply imposing its own hegemony on the rest of Europe by
applying foreign aid in order to create an international capitalist system that would
reinforce the economy of the U.S. The post-revisionists refute this theory by taking a
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more complex look at the variant relationships of all nations and peoples involved in
ERP. I will then discuss the current scholarship on the Marshall Plan with regard to
Ireland. The background on the ERP and the historical problems associated with
Ireland and the Marshall Plan will provide a context for the propaganda campaign
implemented by Seán MacBride and the Department of External Affairs and the film
The Promise of Barty O’Brien.
The film The Promise of Barty O’Brien was one of many films issued by the
ECA to promote the Marshall Plan. However, the film is unique in that it is a fulllength feature film that is a fictional piece of art in addition to being a propaganda
piece. The film was written by the famous Irish writer Sean O’Faolain and was
comprised of mostly Irish actors and crew. The Marshall Plan films like The Promise of
Barty O’Brien have only recently become available. Albert Hemsing, who was an
American member of the Information Division in Paris in the 1950s, recounted how
difficult it was to get Congress to lift the ban on the screening of the Marshall Plan’s
propaganda films in America. The prohibition against the Marshall films originated in
the Smith-Mundt Act, United States Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948.
Even when Congress officially lifted the ban on the screening of the films in 1990, most
of the public, including scholars, have had limited access to the films.2 While most of

2

Elizabeth Heffelfinger, “Foreign Policy, Domestic Fiction: Governmentsponsored Documentaries and Network Television Promote the Marshall Plan at
Home,” Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 28, no. 1 (March 2008), 3.
The Smith-Mundt act is also known as the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange
Act and was passed in 1948. The act was created to distribute pro-U.S. and anti-Soviet
propaganda around the globe. The act stipulated that no propaganda would be
disseminated in the United States as a protective measure for the American people. The
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the films are attainable through the National Archives II in College Park, Maryland, it is
difficult and expensive to obtain a copy for individual viewing, much less a film
screening. However, the Marshall Plan films from the European Unit are a rich primary
source for understanding this era. The film The Promise of Barty O’Brien is
particularly interesting because it was not only a propaganda film extolling the virtues
of the Marshall Plan, but it was also a full-length fictional feature film written by a
prominent Irish writer and endorsed by the Irish Department of External Affairs. In
many ways this American propaganda film was an Irish-issued and approved
propaganda film as well. Significantly, the struggle of Barty O’Brien in the film
mirrors the struggle of many Irish people and Irish officials, who were caught between
clinging to traditional values versus exploring modernization and closer ties to the
United States.
In the third chapter, I will explain how the ambivalent relationships with the
United Kingdom and the United States impeded Ireland’s quest for integration with
Europe. Ireland’s refusal to sever the bilateral economic ties to Britain along with its
attempt to remove itself culturally and politically from Britain are evidence of the
ambivalent relationship the country had with its neighbor during the postwar years.
While Ireland had a history of friendly and amicable relationships with America, many
Irish officials were wary of adopting the ERP because of a concern over the influx of
what they viewed as crass American materialism, cultural insensitivity, and haste.

Marshall Plan films were finally available for viewing in the United States in 1990
when Massachusetts Senator John Kerry introduced an amendment to the act to allow
for the Marshall Plan films to be screened in the U.S.
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Chapters four and five will reveal how the expansion of the Department of
External Affairs allowed the department to play a key role in Ireland’s foray into
international affairs, but the department’s hijacking of ERP propaganda for the purpose
of anti-partition propaganda alienated U.S. officials. The Economic Cooperation
Administration (ECA) functioned as the administrative agency charged with monitoring
how Marshall Plan funds were being implemented. The ECA worked with the local
information divisions in the European countries to implement pro-American, proMarshall plan propaganda through radio, newspapers, exhibitions and film. Although
the Department of External Affairs worked to publicize ERP, they did so according to
their own political agenda by making the problem of partition an issue in propaganda
media.
This thesis is arranged by the specific areas of tension resulting in Ireland’s
failure to integrate in the new world order envisioned by planners and most participants
of ERP. The exploration of the Department of External Affairs and the film The
Promise of Barty O’Brien will add to scholarship based on recently released and newly
discovered media relating to the Marshall Plan and ERP. The film must be viewed
within these contexts: Ireland’s complicated relationship with Britain and the United
States, its status of neutrality during the war, a push by some individuals to integrate
with Europe and modernize Irish economics and culture into a more industrial society
like the United States, and its quest to provide a fresh vision for itself as a new nation in
the post-World War II new world era.
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CHAPTER TWO
History and Historiography of the European Recovery Plan and Ireland

This chapter addresses the complex history of the ERP and the evolution of its
historiography. Even though the Americans concocted the concept of the Marshall
Plan, the Europeans created and implemented the official European Recovery Program.
European recovery involved economic improvement through technical assistance,
removing trade barriers including tariffs, and increasing consumerism. It was also a
way to curtail the perceived encroachment of communism into Western Europe. The
initial historiography of the Marshall Plan focused on European success as a result of
American funding, resources and ingenuity. Scholars held a very American-centric
view and did not initially incorporate the complex interactions between the European
nations and individuals. Historians later began to look at the multilateral relationships
between European countries within the context of the Marshall Plan. Recent
historiography reflects a more nuanced approach that transects social, political, and
economic spheres. Complex relationships existed among individuals, multilateral
institutions, and countries. The problems of these complex relationships were
compounded by issues of cultural and political nationalism, which both motivated the
Irish ERP players and hindered them in their quest for opportunities through ERP
resources. This chapter will provide background on the European Recovery Program
and reveal how the research of this thesis fits into contemporary scholarship.
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The ERP’s goal was not only to help Europe recover from the economic
devastation of World War II, but it would also provide a stronghold against the threat of
totalitarian regimes. Although Ireland did not face a significant threat from antidemocratic regimes, the economy of the nation was important for British economic
success and, therefore, Ireland was awarded ERP funding in the form of both loans and
grants. The Marshall Plan’s dual goals of economic recovery and providing a
stronghold against communist regimes will provide a context for highlighting the ways
in which Irish leaders attempted to align themselves with these goals while promoting
their own political agenda of anti-partition.
The European Recovery Plan did not begin as a cohesive plan at all, but rather a
speech by George C. Marshall at Harvard University in June 1947. Although the idea of
providing Europe with a system of economic restructuring and stability in order to
prevent another major war was not new, Marshall’s speech marked a moment in time
when key U.S. officials had deliberately decided to take action to restructure Europe
and provide resources including financial aid. In the late 1940s, during the height of the
Marshall Plan, the U.S. provided 60 percent of the world’s foreign aid. In addition to
the economic devastation of World War II, the threat of communism was a major
impetus for implementing foreign funding on such a grand scale. In his speech,
Marshall claimed “the remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the
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confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and
Europe as a whole.”3
President Truman and Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson supported George
C. Marshall’s vision of providing economic resources to Europe in order to prevent the
spread of communism and avoid another global war. In March, three months before
Marshall’s speech to the graduates at Harvard, President Truman issued the Truman
Doctrine, which stated that the U.S. would provide both Greece and Turkey with
military and economic aid in their fight against the communist Soviets. Truman
presented his doctrine to a joint-session of Congress on March 12, 1947. The President
explained the reasons why he requested military support and money for Greece and
Turkey. Truman and other U.S. officials believed that without intervention in Greece
and Turkey, the free peoples of the Western world might succumb to totalitarian and,
specifically, communist regimes. Truman believed the United States should take a lead
role in the development of peaceful nations through the organization of the United
Nations, which would
make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We
shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help
free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity
against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian
regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian
regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression,

3

George C. Marshall, “George C. Marshall’s Marshall Plan Speech in June
1947,” Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org [accessed January 17, 2008].
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undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security
of the United States.4
Although the speech is specifically a call to action to provide help to Greece and
Turkey, the speech also implies that U.S. assistance will provide a bulwark against
totalitarian regimes everywhere and that support will be given, not only in the interest
of peace, but also to protect U.S. security. And the international body of the United
Nations would play a key role in maintaining peace and protecting democracy.
International organizations like the U.N. and cooperative nations involved in European
recovery would provide a stronghold against the threat of democracy. The Truman
Doctrine became the first of many efforts on behalf of the U.S. government to contain
communism and provide peace and security in the world. Truman is explicit in
explaining the ways in which the United States will support those threatened when he
exclaims
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or
by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work
out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should
be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to
economic stability and orderly political processes.5
U.S. assistance in the postwar era would not only involve military resources to fight
communism and totalitarian regimes, but it would also include (to some extent)
financial funding in order to prevent the aggression by non-democratic governments

4

Harry S. Truman, “President Harry S. Truman’s address before a joint session
of Congress, March 12, 1947,” Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org
[accessed January 17, 2008].
5

Ibid.
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against sovereign democratic states. U.S. officials created the Marshall Plan based on
the concept that the free people of Europe needed economic, political, and military
protection so that they would not fall victim to the Soviets. While the focus of
economic, political, and military protection fell on nations like France and Germany
because of their vulnerability during both World War I and World War II, it is
significant that a neutral and more peripheral nation like Ireland would receive aid.
However, Ireland’s economy was intertwined with Europe, specifically Britain, and
U.S. officials wanted to offer the goal of European recovery to all European nations.
Initially, the Marshall Plan was simply theoretical and, therefore, was not a
cohesive plan containing a timeline and budget for the distribution of aid. U.S. officials
were adamant from the beginning that Europe would be involved in the creation,
adaptation, and implementation of a plan to improve their economy and provide a
system of working together. Secretary Marshall insisted the Europeans would
collaborate in the implementation of the plan. In his speech, Marshall notes
it would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this government to
undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on
its feet economically. This is the business of Europeans. The initiative, I
think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist
of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support
of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The
program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all,
European nations.6
After Marshall’s speech, U.S. officials believed it was more important to notify the
Europeans of this plan before they informed the Americans. When Marshall’s speech
6

George C. Marshall, “George C. Marshall’s Marshall Plan Speech in June
1947,” Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org [accessed January 17, 2008].
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was presented at Harvard, the press was not even present. This might have been a
strategic choice by officials to contain and control the distribution of information,
particularly to the American press. However, Dean Acheson was dispatched
immediately after the speech to contact the European media, in particular the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), with news of the plan. Acheson realized the
importance of spreading the news of the plan to the Europeans first and foremost,
because he expected there might be resistance to what the Europeans might perceive as
American intervention. Acheson wanted to notify the Europeans of the Marshall Plan
as soon as possible so that the initiative for the plan would come from them and not
simply be a U.S. imposed operation. He also wanted to get European support, before
calling on Congress and the American people to provide funding to Europe. Acheson
also realized that he would be facing a resistant Congress when he asked for monies to
support Europe, but if he could approach Congress with European support it might
provide some leverage to get Congress to comply. Leonard Miall, a BBC
correspondent, attended a luncheon with Acheson in the United States a few days before
Marshall’s speech. In a 1977 interview with Miall conducted by Marshall Foundation
Librarian Barbara Vandegrift, Miall discusses Acheson’s influence in getting the word
out regarding the Marshall Plan—both to the European community and to Congress.
When asked whether or not Acheson engaged in a “calculated leak” regarding U.S. aid
to Europe and abroad, Miall says,
Well, yes and no. There was certainly a "calculated leak" in the sense
that he was very strongly stressing to us the fact that the response must
come from Europe, that there must be a European initiative. He said that
he and his colleagues had been up to The Hill far too often with panaceas
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for the economic ills of Europe. First, there had been UNRRA, and then
the British Loan, and then the Truman Doctrine, one thing after another
and each time they promised this was going to bring us peace in our
time, and prosperity, and each time it had failed to do so.7
Acheson was very much aware that Congress was not in the mood to support another
dose of what the economizers in Congress would call "Operation Rathole", because the
congressional elections in the fall of 1946 had resulted in a strong Republican majority
in both houses who were concerned with the budget. There was not a "calculated leak"
in either of these senses.8 Miall explains how Acheson, at the luncheon on June 2,
revealed the policies of the Marshall Plan to the European journalists a few days before
Marshall’s speech. As a correspondent in Washington, D.C., Miall was able to get an
advanced copy of Marshall’s speech and was surprised to see the similarities in
Acheson’s discussions of U.S. policy at the luncheon and the speech. It was clear that
U.S. officials had a cohesive and somewhat united idea of what European recovery
might entail and they were adamant that the Europeans were notified before the
American people so that their participation in the plan would be self-chosen and not
simply be imposed by a foreign entity. This was extremely significant for smaller
countries like Ireland who, for the first time, were able to enter the international arena
and participate with other European countries on a grand scale of recovery and possible

7

Barbara Vandegrift, George C. Marshall Foundation, “BBC Correspondent
Leonard Miall and the Marshall Plan Speech: An Interview,” George C. Marshall
Foundation, http://www.marshallfoundation.org/library [accessed January 17, 2008].
Marshall Foundation Librarian Barbara Vandegrift interviewed Mr. Miall on September
19, 1977 at the library in Lexington, Virginia.
8

Ibid.
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integration.
Once the Europeans were notified of the speech, the U.S. actively campaigned
for European acceptance of the Marshall Plan concept. The plan needed to be approved
by the Europeans and eventually Congress before it became official. After several
meetings of European nations in Paris, the Europeans sent a reconstruction plan, which
they developed, to Washington. After the resistance of some members of Congress in
accepting the plan, it was ultimately passed, and President Truman signed it into law on
April 3, 1948. Once the plan was approved, the ECA was created to carry out the plan.
ECA officials would work closely with European officials. In Ireland, the ECA would
develop a complex relationship with Irish leaders, particularly in the Department of
External Affairs.
The first administrator of the ECA was Paul Hoffman. Hoffman believed
deeply in the Marshall Plan’s goal of combating communism. He also felt that the
United States “as the leader of the free world… must by deeds and words make clear to
all peoples our devotion to the idea of a free, peaceful and more ample life for all
men.”9 It is quite fitting that Hoffman, a former car salesman and president of the
Studebaker car company, was named the first administrator of the ECA. It would take a
car salesman not only to sell the idea of European recovery via U.S. financial assistance
to the Europeans, but also to the Americans—particularly the American taxpayer.
Before the ECA took over, the State Department was in charge of the ERP
structure. The State Department’s vision included a need to see Europe
9

Paul Hoffman, Peace Can Be Won (New York: Doubleday 1951), 125.
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increase in production, expand foreign trade, lower or remove all barriers
to the free movement of trade and commerce and peoples, achieve
financial stability and realize European unity. In other words the United
States envisaged a United States of Europe in order to remake the old
world in the likeness of the new.10
This idea of remaking Europe into a model like the United States—democratic and
capitalistic—became the focus of the Marshall Plan during this time. There was a push,
both by the Americans and the Europeans, for the lifting of trade barriers and tariffs and
a move towards European integration. Free trade, lower tariffs, and increased
production would prevent European countries from gravitating towards more extreme
socialist, even communist, institutions with economic and political isolation from the
rest of Europe and the world.11
While many European diplomats and foreign affairs leaders were excited about
the potential of European Recovery, some Europeans reacted with ambivalence when
confronted with the Marshall Plan. Many Europeans believed that American officials
underestimated European leaders’ ability to recover from the physical, emotional, and
economic devastation caused by two successive world wars. However, most European
countries gladly accepted money, in terms of both grants and loans, from U.S. officials
10

Bernadette Whelan, “The Messages and Methods of the Marshall Plan in
Ireland and Italy,” in Ireland, Europe and the Marshall Plan, eds. Till Geiger and
Michael Kennedy (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004), 132.
11

Bernadette Whelan, “Marshall Plan, Publicity and Propaganda in Italy and
Ireland, 1947-1951,” Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 23, no. 4, (2003):
311-318. Marshall Planners were particularly concerned about socialism and
communism in Italy. While trade unions and leftists were of concern in Ireland,
Marshall Planners focused specifically on Ireland’s improved economy and production.
Many U.S. officials and the CIA felt that Ireland was somewhat safe from the
encroachment of communism because of the strong Roman Catholicism in the country.
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in order to boost their country’s ability to recover from the economic devastation of the
war. Europeans perceived the ERP as a potential threat to their sovereignty; and, yet,
many believed the plan would be a way to bring Europe back from the brink. Henry
Kissinger, a German-born American political scientist, who understood the European
perspective because of his background and knowledge of European political history,
later acknowledged the disconnect between Europe and the U.S. at the founding of the
ERP because the Americans
failed to recall the European dynamism which had launched the
Industrial Revolution, the political philosophy which had spawned the
concept of national sovereignty, or the European style of diplomacy
which had operated a complex balance of power system for some three
centuries.12
Many Europeans were wary and critical of the idea that the U.S. was going to save
Europe from economic and political downfall. Europeans were keenly aware that the
United States did not invent democracy or industrialization. After all, the Europeans
first conceived democracy in Greece and expanded the concept in England. And the
first industrial revolution evolved in Europe. Some Irish leaders would use this
argument against U.S. officials because they feared the encroachment of U.S. culture
which they viewed as crass. They mistrusted the idea that U.S. leaders would be the

12

Denise Dunne, “The Political Legacy of the Marshall Plan: An Assessment of
the Integrationist Agenda Through a British Lens,” in Ireland, Europe and the Marshall
Plan, eds. Till Geiger and Michael Kennedy (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004), 60.
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saviors of Europeans, who were quite capable despite the desperate conditions
following the war.
Therefore, when the United States began to promote the Marshall Plan, many
Europeans, including the Irish, reacted with ambivalence. At the time of ERP, the
Department of External Affairs was the foreign affairs and diplomatic department of
Ireland. The Department was comprised of a dynamic group of forward-thinking
diplomats and individuals who, for the most part, welcomed the ERP and the ECA
officials stationed in Ireland. This openness to the ERP by External Affairs contrasts
with the Department of Finance, which was less eager to dissolve the current economic
structure where Ireland was dependent on the Sterling dollar and traded almost
exclusively with the United Kingdom. The Marshall Plan was also attacked by groups
such as the Irish Worker League, an Irish communist party who were against the
capitalism of the U.S., and by Irish nationalists and individuals among the Irish
intellectual elite who feared the ERP would lead to a contamination of culture by the
U.S. because they perceived the U.S. as secular, pagan, and materialistic.
Scholarship regarding the Marshall Plan is diverse and complex because there
were so many players involved in one of the most complicated and expensive
international programs ever implemented. In many ways, the historiography of the ERP
has evolved from an American-centric perspective to a Euro-centric perspective. Now,
scholars are looking at the Marshall Plan through the lens of specific nations, such as
Ireland. Ireland may seem like a seemingly insignificant player in the international
game of postwar Europe, but it is important. In many ways, it shared a symbiotic

19
economic relationship with the United Kingdom. Economic success in Britain
depended heavily on Irish economic success—particularly through the mass production
of agriculture which was exported to the people of the United Kingdom. The United
Kingdom would have been in a desperate economic situation after the war without Irish
agricultural imports. However, the unique situation of Ireland—a western European
country and, yet, a former colony of the United Kingdom—created enormous tension
between these two economically intertwined entities. Because of this historical tension
with the United Kingdom, Ireland utilized the ERP to advance its nationalistic cause.13
This is significant because Irish nationalism, used in the guise of ERP propaganda,
caused a rift with the ECA and U.S. officials.14 Scholarship on the Marshall Plan has
evolved from looking at the economic success of Europe after the implementation of
ERP to exploring the individual countries involved in, and affected by, ERP.
While historians are divided on the extent to which the Marshall Plan affected
European economic recovery and integration, most scholars of the Marshall Plan in the
1950s and 1960s argued that the plan was an immediate success and a great
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achievement since most Western European countries were able to make a remarkable
economic recovery after the war. In 1955, Harry B. Price praised the achievements of
the Marshall Plan in his work The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning. The work was
comprised of interviews with Marshall Plan officials such as General George C.
Marshall, Secretary of State; George F. Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff,
State Department; Harold Stein, Head, Washington Office, Committee for the Marshall
Plan; and Francis Wilcox, Chief of Staff, and Senate Foreign Relations Committee.15
The problem with Price’s research on the Marshall Plan was twofold. First of all, while
he interviewed many individuals, the majority of the individuals that he interviewed
were U.S. officials. A more thorough investigation of Marshall Plan success should
have included the perspectives of more European officials. Secondly, the interviews
were conducted in 1952 and 1953, barely enough time to rate the success or failure of a
vast economic recovery program that began as a speech in 1947, only five years before
the first interviews were conducted.
Indeed, most of the early scholarship from the 1950s and 1960s on the Marshall
Plan focused on the success of European economic recovery because of the generosity
and ingenuity of the United States. In many ways the early scholarship included an
American-centric perspective and was very pro-U.S. in terms of interpreting the success
of the ERP. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, revisionist historians challenged whether
European economic success was based on U.S. ingenuity and resources alone. Some
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scholars even claimed that the motives of U.S. officials were not altruistic when they
implemented the plan in Europe. In discussing the Marshall Plan in the context of the
Cold War, some revisionists claimed the United States used the war and European
recovery in order to advance economic and political domination. Gabriel and Joyce
Kolko accused the United States of outright imperialism because the U.S. took
advantage of a weak Europe in order to exploit the continent to the advantage of the
U.S. economy. They explored the social history of the diplomatic aspect of foreign
policy in the years after the Marshall Plan and offered an extremely negative
interpretation of U.S. intentions.16 This view could be reduced to “economic
determinism” according to the scholar Bruce Cumings, and is limiting in that it does not
take into account the active participation, motivations, and decisions by foreign nations
and individuals.17 Postrevisionists, like John Lewis Gaddis, attacked this argument,
stating that revisionists like Kolko concentrated too much on economics and ignored
political, social, and cultural motivations.18 However, many European officials,
including the members of the Irish Department of External Affairs, actively courted
U.S. monies and aid.
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Unlike the revisionists, Scott Jackson contributed to the historical scholarship of
the Marshall Plan in 1979 by taking a more nuanced approach and exploring the diverse
motivations of individuals. He interpreted the events by investigating the Marshall Plan
in the context of the following: American generosity, the context of the Cold War, and
as a means to sustain the international economy at the end of World War II.19 His
approach also differed from the scholars before him because he explored the complex
motivations and relationships of governments and government agencies involved.
Rather than looking at the implementation and success rates of programs and
institutions, Jackson explored the individual players and their effect on the Marshall
Plan. Jackson’s interpretation of the Marshall Plan also reflects a shift among some
historians from examining primarily U.S. officials’ motivations and American
perceptions to researching a variety of perspectives: Russian, British among others.
Jackson explains how, in 1947, a complex network of motivation emerged. He
discusses how the decisions made by disparate officials in the White House, Paris, and
Moscow revealed “deep and widespread currents of thinking.”20
Jackson’s interpretation differs widely from that of John Gimbel, who claimed
that the Marshall Plan officials were not concerned with European economic recovery
or the containment of communism; instead they created the Marshall Plan and ERP in
order to deal with a disjointed Germany. Gimbel claimed that the ERP’s purpose was
19
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not to inject the entire European economy with an economic stimulus shot, but the plan
was actually intended to build up the German economy specifically.21 Gimbel’s narrow
interpretation of the Marshall Plan is contrasted with scholars such as Jackson who saw
the complexity in motivations and relationships of those involved. Because such a
diverse group of Americans and Europeans created the program of the Marshall Plan,
such a singular purpose with regard to Germany was not possible.
A postrevisionist interpretation of the Marshall Plan emerged in the 1980s and
1990s. The postrevisionist reaction developed as a result of newly released archives.
Although John Lewis Gaddis did not invent the term post-revisionism, his writings on
the Cold War in the 1970s and 1980s prompted an ongoing debate among scholars.
Gaddis demanded a more thoughtful approach to studying the complexities of the Cold
War and called on scholars to provide a more sophisticated analysis of what the
revisionists called U.S. imperialism.22 He attacked the revisionist historians by advising
them to rely more on archives than their own whims—such as suggesting U.S. leaders
convinced the American people to advance Cold War ideology for the purpose of U.S.
imperialism. Bruce Cumings reacted to Gaddis’ argument by claiming that Gaddis was
not a postrevisionist at all but an “antirevisionist”, because while he lambasted the
revisionists, he still clung to the original Cold War orthodox views from the previous

21

John Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1976).
22

John Lewis Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins
of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 7 (Summer 1983): 171-190.

24
generation.23 Despite Cumings critique of Gaddis, Gaddis would eventually become
one of the most important Cold War scholars to date. Gaddis continues to argue against
the idea that U.S. imperialism alone was the impetus for the Marshall Plan and U.S.
involvement in Europe after World War II. He claims that the differences between the
political structures of the totalitarianism of the Soviet Union versus the democratic
government of the United States affected the degree and control they wielded over other
nations. Gaddis argues that U.S. leaders believed the function of government was to
facilitate freedom, and although the U.S. might help regulate the economy in Europe
through resources and funding, they did not, like the Soviet Union, control all aspects of
it.24 Geir Lundestad distinguished the United States’ empire from that of other
totalitarian regimes by indicating that the United States’ empire was an “empire by
invitation.” In other words, rather than imposing its will on other nations, Americans
built their empire based on American values of democracy and free-will therefore
allowing a certain amount of autonomy and independence for other nations under the
umbrella of hegemony of the U.S.25 Although scholars disagree about the motivations
and the intentions with regard to imperialism, some Europeans were wary of U.S.
intentions when they implemented the ERP. As a result of newly available government
archives, post-revisionist historians like Sallie Pisani utilized new archival material to
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provide a different interpretation of the Marshall Plan. In a 1991 study of the Marshall
Plan administration and the Office of Policy Coordination (later the Central Intelligence
Agency), Pisani demonstrates how U.S. officials used the Marshall Plan for covert
interventionist purposes to combat communism.26
Another ongoing debate among historians was the degree of success of the
Marshall Plan. Some scholars, such as Immanuel Wexler, claimed that the ERP was
actually a success based on data that revealed a rise in European production and trade.
However, he describes how the ERP fell short of achieving total financial stability and
European integration as a whole.27 Others, such as Alan Milward, challenged the idea
that the Marshall Plan was even a success. Milward argued that Europe would have
recovered eventually with or without the aid of the Americans.28 Michael J. Hogan
attacked Milward’s argument by stating that there was no way that the Americans could
foresee the eventual economic recovery of Europe, with or without their help.29 But
what Milward was attempting to do was to compare the United States’ vision of
European economic and political integration versus what actually happened and even
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what could have happened without U.S. intervention. This vision, where the U.S. used
its own nineteenth century framework of economic and political unification as a model
for European recovery, underestimated Europe’s ability to recover economically and
maintain political stability with or without U.S. help. In many ways Hogan and
Milward are both correct. Milward was attempting to shatter the syllogism that
American economic aid leads to European recovery. American ERP, like Hogan
suggests, did provide Europe with a foundation to build on, but Hogan often presents
the Europeans as passive recipients of the generosity of the Americans rather than
active members and decision makers in their own recovery effort.
In the 1990s, historians such as David Ellwood looked at the specific methods
used by the U.S. to promote growth and productivity. Ellwood discusses the
reinvention of American power in the context of a post-World War II and Cold War
world, but he also challenges the notion that Marshall Aid policies and programs alone
led to European economic recovery. Ellwood suggests that intra-European exports are
what led to the European Economic Community (EEC) in March 1957 and, ultimately,
the European Union (EU) in 1993. The American push for growth, the breaking down
of trade barriers and European integration were important, but not as important as the
Europeans ultimately choosing of their own volition to work together.30 While the
historiography of the Marshall Plan from the 1950s to the 1980s was American-centered
and focused on the success or failure of Marshall Aid to the Europeans, Ellwood and
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others began to look at Marshall Aid from the perspective of the Europeans within their
own context of economic stability and integration.
Recent writing on the Marshall Plan has moved beyond merely analyzing the
American-European bilateral relationship. Contemporary scholars are researching the
individuals and institutions of specific nations involved in, and affected by, the ERP.
Scholars of Ireland and the Marshall Plan are shifting their focus from analyzing the
bilateral Irish-American economic aid relationship and looking at the multi-lateral
relationships that affected the ERP outcome. The emerging literature shows the
importance of placing the Irish experience in its wider European context. In Raymond
J. Raymond’s groundbreaking work, he discussed the improbable fact that Ireland was
considered for Marshall Plan Aid at all because of the country’s neutral position during
World War II. Because of Ireland’s position during the war and its marginal place
alongside the European powerhouse countries like the United Kingdom, it is remarkable
that Ireland was even considered at all in the American plan for European integration
and economic stimulus.31
The most recent scholarship on Ireland and the ERP comes from the
publications of Irish ERP scholars. In the 1990s and beyond, scholars from Ireland and
other European countries have united to discuss the relevance and importance of
Ireland’s role in the postwar recovery of Europe. Modern scholars are discussing the
31
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history of Ireland’s involvement in the ERP by viewing the plan through several lenses:
the Irish government’s complicated political and economic relationship with the United
Kingdom, Ireland’s relationship with other European countries, and Ireland’s internal
struggle among different factions in Irish government and society who disagreed on
what type of postwar, twentieth century vision Ireland should adopt for the country.
Bernadette Whelan has written the most comprehensive study of Ireland and
ERP in her work Ireland and the Marshall Plan, 1947-57. Whelan traces the origins of
the U.S. invitation to Ireland to join the ERP, its involvement in the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the establishment of the plan, the loans
versus grant issue of Marshall Aid, and the push for productivity, production, publicity,
and propaganda in Ireland. Whelan’s scholarship is important because the story of Irish
involvement in the Marshall Plan has never been fully explained. Most ERP scholars
have a narrow focus when interpreting the ERP and Ireland, concentrating on just
economic or social or political issues. But, Whelan argues, Ireland’s involvement in
ERP warranted a large study because it transects the economic, social, political, and
diplomatic history during the postwar decade.32 Whelan’s work presents a
comprehensive study of the path to economic recovery and European integration for
Ireland in the years of ERP. Whelan has also tackled more specific issues involving
Ireland and the ERP. She has written extensively on the publicity and propaganda of
the Marshall Plan, particularly with regard to the defense and the containment of
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communism. Initially, the ERP propaganda was supposed to focus on selling the
Marshall Plan to the Europeans, but increasingly and specifically after the outbreak of
the Korean War in 1950, ERP propaganda began to emphasize the importance of
prosperity and peace as a defense against communism. Whelan asserts that, in many
ways, the implementation of the Marshall Plan did not alter the outlook of Irish officials
when it came to neutrality, pacifism, and partition. She states that “Ireland was neutral
and partitioned when the Marshall Plan began, and it remained so when the plan
ended.”33 This thesis will build upon Whelan’s work by looking at specific propaganda
media, such as The Promise of Barty O’Brien, in demonstrating how Irish officials
prioritized the issue of partition above integration, industrialization, and consumer
prosperity.
Whelan and other contemporary Irish historians are divided regarding Irish
economic success and the rate of adaptation to the goals of the ERP. Troy Davis argues
that Irish nationalist commentators have tended to treat official Washington as an
extension of British government. Davis asserts that this view has led many nationalist
historians to be critical of American Cold War policy decisions involving Ireland.
Davis claims that the U.S. policies were not necessarily anti-Irish and pro-British. He
suggests that issues such as partition tended to alienate the U.S. and the rest of Europe.
He also argues that Washington could not be anti-Irish and pro-British since it did not
even have a specific Irish policy because Ireland was not considered a major contender
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or even ally in the Cold War.34 Whelan disagrees with Davis by demonstrating that
there was a concerted effort by U.S. officials to treat Ireland as a “less favoured nation”
by giving the majority of the Marshall Aid in the form of loans and not grants.35 This
thesis will demonstrate how Irish officials alienated U.S. officials by manipulating ERP
propaganda in order to promote their own anti-partition agenda. Because of Ireland’s
neutrality during World War II and since Ireland was a less important figure in Europe
and in the Cold War, Ireland was not given the same priority as the United Kingdom.
However, because Irish officials continually emphasized Irish nationalism and the
problem of partition in ERP propaganda, they further alienated ECA and U.S. officials.
Contemporary historians challenge the extent to which Irish officials embraced
integration and the push for mass consumerism and industrialization in the 1940s and
1950s. Regarding industrialization and consumerism, Whelan acknowledges the tension
among the Irish who grappled with their love of American goods and media, but also
despised the American propagation of “pagan, materialistic and hedonistic values.”36
Till Geiger, in reviewing recently released archival material, concluded that the Irish
policy makers became concerned that the United States would pressure Ireland to end
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its longstanding policy of economic nationalism.37 However, Whelan emphasizes the
importance of the Marshall Plan in ending Ireland’s self-imposed isolation because of
neutrality during the war. Whelan argues that Irish involvement in the ERP revealed a
step toward an Europeanization of Irish foreign policy. Although Whelan recounts the
reluctance of Irish officials to join the ERP, she notes that it was a crucial decision in
the long run for Ireland to prepare for the eventual integration with Europe that
happened with the European Community (now European Union).38 Brian Girvin claims
that Ireland did not improve because of American aid because Ireland’s isolationist
tendencies prevented the nation from reaping the benefits of ERP. Girvin argues that it
was Ireland’s isolationism and economic ties to Britain that prevented the country from
benefiting from Marshall Aid the way that other European countries did.39 Both Girvin
and Whelan’s arguments reveal the tension among Irish leaders who desired to integrate
with Europe and, yet, still grappled with their economic ties to the United Kingdom.
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But, despite the economic isolation from Europe and trade barriers, foreign
affairs leaders in the Irish Department of External Affairs were advocates of increasing
production and even industrialization. Publicity campaigns, such as the film The
Promise of Barty O’Brien, reveal the promotion of mass production, machinery, and the
American ideals of consumerism. The U.S. Government and European officials were
extremely concerned with improving the economy, the rate of production and
industrialization. The United States, through the ERP, attempted to revitalize the
economy of Europe. Most of Western Europe was already industrialized and ERP
would revitalize industrialization and trade among European nations. But, the goal of
the ERP was not only to restore Europe to an industrialized, democratic continent, but
the goal was also to create a model of consumerism like that of the U.S. United States
officials wanted to produce a nation of consumers, not only of European goods but of
U.S. exports as well. The Irish grappled with their love of U.S. media and their distrust
of what many Irish people perceived as crass materialism and paganism.40
Ireland is significant because it was, in many ways, a third world country in
terms of industrial production. Ireland was still very much an agricultural country.
Farm machinery was sparse and the most important tiller on the farm at the time was
not a machine, but a horse. Since Ireland was devoid of industrial factories and,
therefore, did not produce much beyond agriculture, Ireland did not have a consumer
economy. The creation of the Technical Assistance Program, which became important
to Marshall Plan supporters in Ireland, highlighted the need for improvement in
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development. President Truman proposed his “Point Four” regarding the Technical
Assistance program and how the U.S. would embark on a bold new program for using
scientific knowledge and industrial progress to improve the growth of underdeveloped
areas. Peter Murray’s research on the Marshall Plan and technical assistance revealed
the limitations of the program because of Irish conservatism and the actual suspension
of aid in January 1952.41 Technical assistance would train Irish workers to be able to
improve the efficiency, quality, and quantity of their work and this would lead to Irish
industrial development.
Northern Ireland contained the largest industrial area of Ireland, but the rest of
Ireland lost its connection to industrialization after partition. Industrialization was a
primary concern among Irish officials during the implementation of ERP. In a memo
from the Department of External Affairs there was a discussion of a poster campaign
not only to praise the ERP but also to show how Ireland’s “economic problem is
increased by the partition of the industrial portion of the country from the rest.”42
Scholars, such as Denis O’Hearn, argue that British and American power impeded
Ireland’s attempts to industrialize. O’Hearn even claims that, after partition, Ireland’s
attempts at industrialization were hindered by U.S. companies that wanted to use
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Ireland as a platform for accessing European markets.43 The rise of linen production in
the north compounded economic problems for the south and west of Ireland after
partition. Irish industry was so heavily concentrated in the north and the agrarian
economy became peripheral compared to the industrial northern sector of Ireland.
Industrialization was a key talking point of Irish leaders during this time. Irish
leaders like Seán MacBride believed the twentieth century’s new industrial power, the
United States, challenged old industrial Europe when it began providing raw materials
to Europe, causing Europe to import more than it was exporting. The industrialization
of the United States in the late and early twentieth century caused a “turn of the tide” by
creating a dollar deficit in Europe, where the balance of trade was disrupted when
Europeans were importing more than they were exporting. The two world wars caused
further chaos in the economy of Europe because there was a shortage of supplies and
raw materials. After the war, Ireland was in a difficult position compared to the rest of
Western Europe because the economy relied heavily on agriculture and there was a
dysfunctional interdependence between the British and Irish economy.44 The European
Recovery Plan was the impetus for economic change because it would break down trade
barriers and integrate Europe economically. Ireland’s codependence with Britain’s
economy hindered attempts at economic integration. Because Ireland’s economy was
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primarily based on agricultural production only, Irish officials, particularly in the
Department of External Affairs, advocated an increase in industrialization in order to
maximize land, labor, and capital in Ireland. Both Irish and U.S. officials believed that
an increase in agricultural production on a mass scale utilizing industrial equipment,
electrification, and the Technical Assistance Program (which are all emphasized in The
Promise of Barty O’Brien) would modernize Ireland. A desire by many Irish officials
to increase industrialization in Ireland reflects a paradigm shift in thinking at the time.
The Marshall planners actively supported urban and rural workers because of this belief
that high productivity, high wages, and a high consumption economy would lead to a
better, more democratic way of life.45 However, not all members of Irish society were
ready to embrace the values of capitalizing on land and increasing the production of
goods that are so indicative of what makes a modern society, according to the U.S.
standards of the time.46
This chapter reveals the complex history of the Marshall Plan and how a
European and, specifically, Irish perspective is needed to fill in the gaps of the Marshall
Plan players. David Ellwood claimed that the Marshall Plan was “more than the sum of
its parts”, and this thesis will support this claim by showing the struggle of individuals
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in defining the identity of Ireland within the disparate aspects of ERP.47 Individuals in
the Department of External Affairs like Seán MacBride and intellectual leaders like
Sean O’Faolain embraced their national heritage but also viewed the ERP as an
opportunity to integrate Europe and improve agricultural industrialization. The plan
was not just about economic recovery, but about selling a new vision to Europe. That
vision would involve an integrated Europe through “empire by invitation” with the
guidance and leadership of the United States. European countries such as Ireland, were
attempting to define what their new vision would be and how that vision would fit into
industrialization and integration. In other words, would Ireland retain its conservative,
nationalistic and economic co-dependence with Britain or would it accept U.S. monies
and influence and work towards European integration?
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CHAPTER THREE
Sean O’Faolain and The Promise of Barty O’Brien:
Irish Propaganda and Nationalism in an ERP Film
Sometimes we would get visits from “big shots.” That day there were
two—one from the ESB (Electricity Supply Board). They run Ireland’s
power. And the other from ECA. We didn’t know then what those
mysterious letters meant. You know, of course—Economic Cooperation
Administration. It didn’t mean much to me then. It did later. ‘Twas the
Marshall Plan.48

The film The Promise of Barty O’Brien is unique because it was not simply a
propaganda medium for the ERP, but it was also a full-length fictional drama written by
a famous Irish writer and performed by the leading actors of the famous Abbey theatre
in Dublin. The film, although a propaganda piece for the American ERP, was created
for the Irish by the Irish. The film serves as a lens through which to view the struggle
of many Irish people and officials between the traditional and the modern, isolationism
and integration. The film illustrates the rural, antiquated, agricultural production in the
Irish countryside and advocates for an increase in productivity through newer industrial
farm equipment, electrification, and technical training. A young Irish farm boy, Barty
O’Brian, participates in the Technical Assistance Program when he ventures to the
United States to learn the special skills needed to improve production in Ireland. The
film is also significant because it was created during a time when the Irish were just
beginning to understand the importance of film as a medium of expression, particularly
through the use of film as propaganda rather than simply entertainment. But the most
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fascinating aspect of the film is the extent to which it demonstrates the complexities and
contradictions of O’Faolain’s, and ultimately Ireland’s, vision of the new world order of
ERP. The Promise of Barty O’Brien is also an example of Irish leaders utilizing ERP
publicity for promoting Irish nationalism and therefore exacerbating an already
complicated relationship with the United Kingdom and the United States.
Although the film The Promise of Barty O’Brien was not widely distributed or
seen by the majority of Irish people, it opened in Dublin in 1951 to good reviews.
Kevin O’Kelly of the Sunday Press wrote that the film
demonstrates conclusively that good motion pictures can be made by
Irish technicians….[It] is the first all-Irish propaganda movie worth
serious consideration as a movie. The Government-sponsored films
made till now have merely been highly expensive lantern lectures. They
were a series of pretty pictures hooked up with a mechanized lecturer on
the sound track.49
The film was a full-length feature film running forty-nine minutes and featuring actors
courtesy of the famed Abbey Theatre in Dublin: Harry Brogan as Barty’s father; Eileen
Crowe as Barty’s mother, Doreen Mannen as Barty’s sister; and Philip Flynn as Jim
Byrne. The actor Eric Doyle played Barty O’Brien. The credits open with the names of
the cast and crew against a backdrop of the map of Ireland and the United States with
the Atlantic Ocean linking the two bodies. In large letters, Sean O’Faolain’s name is
shown as the screenwriter and in small letters: “George Freedland was the director and
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producer of the film”.50 The majority of the cast and crew on the film were Irish,
making it an Irish film by the Irish and for the Irish people.
The Promise of Barty O’Brien is significant not because of its success as a
propaganda medium, but it is important because the film illustrates the conflicted
feelings Irish leaders and many Irish people had about American foreign aid and
industrialization. O’Faolain is ambiguous in his treatment of the Irish characters and
modernization in this film. O’Faolain continues a long tradition of Irish nationalism
and mysticism with his glorification of the peasant life of Barty and his family and, at
the same time, he wrote a propaganda screenplay advocating for the benefits of
modernization. While he is a proponent of industrialization in the way he emphasizes
the importance of the power plant, electrification, and education to produce skilled Irish
workers, his portrayal of the backwardness of peasant life is evident in the thatched roof
of the family farm and in the character of Barty’s father. O’Faolain’s Irish roots in land
and agrarian society are evident in the film. He explained the problem of promoting the
peasant life in an earlier work, The Irish: A Character Study, where he declares
we are rooted in the land and in individualism. We have always feared
towns and organized society. We have felt them as spear-heads of lifeways which are complex, troublesome and challenging. To-day we call
those life-ways ‘foreign’ and in trying to impose a peasant life-way on
the towns we try to exclude anything which the peasant (especially the
Catholic peasant) does not understand.51
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O’Faolain’s frustration with the peasants’ resistance to change and the complexities of
modern life emerge in the character of Barty’s father. Barty’s father wants his son to
become a farmer, but he challenges his son to improve his electrical training when the
radio shuts down. Yet, when Barty concedes that he needs more training and confesses
he wants to go to school in Dublin so that he can be an electrical engineer, Barty’s
father cries out “and leave this to go to the hungry city! We would have to pay for
every bite that went into your belly!”52 There is a sense that the city is all consuming
and harsh, while the countryside is nurturing, familial, and part of Barty’s legacy.
O’Faolain has an ambivalent attitude towards urban areas. Dublin is portrayed
as urban and bustling with the energy of cars and business, but it is also conveyed as
overwhelming and lonely. There is a sense of community in the family at the
farmhouse and even in the local pub that is not found in the big city of Dublin or in the
United States. O’Faolain portrays many of the stereotypes in peasant life and peasant
living in his film. The family lives in the traditional thatched roof and does not have
electricity. While this was true of many contemporary farms in Ireland, Barty’s farm
was an exaggeration of peasant living. Barty laments the bog where “nothing grows
there but heather”53 and this statement is contrasted with the image of the power plant
that took over the fields. The image portrays the plant as looming, powerful, and
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productive. The turf is lifted by machines out of the train and loaded into bunkers.
Barty follows the journey of the turf to the furnaces where the turf is burned,
generating heat, turning the water into high pressured steam, steam that
is used over and over again thanks to the big cooling tower next to the
plant. It is the steam which turns the blades of the giant turbine up in the
generator room where turf becomes electric power.54
The plant fascinates Barty, but it also fascinates the viewer with its power, noise,
productivity and its physical presence and dominance contrasted with the small,
thatched-roof farmhouse. This contrast between antiquated and modern, Irish and
international, reveal the ambivalence of O’Faolain’s vision for a new Ireland.
But this new vision for Ireland was overshadowed by the inherent images and
references to Irish nationalism in the film. The issue of nationalism pervaded every
aspect of Irish life, transecting religion, language, ethnicity and culture. Scholars
disagree about a specific definition of what constitutes a nation—is it a shared culture,
language, ethnicity, religion or border? Some scholars identify a nation as a form of
morality, a shared historical consciousness, economic life, territory, language, shared
cultural life, and ethnic and civic obligations.55 Ireland, although a newly formed
republic at this time, had a long history of shared language, religion, and cultural ties.
The importance of religion, Roman Catholicism, lies at the heart of Ireland’s national
identity and its assertion of nationalism. Brian Jenkins argues that despite England’s
ability to reconcile people of the most diverse races to their rule, the Irish have yet to be
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reconciled to the union with the United Kingdom. It was religion more than any other
factor that defined Irish nationalism and opposition to the Protestant English.56
Although it was an English colony for centuries, these shared cultural ties and the
oppression of the Irish by the English united the Irish. The struggle for home rule and
autonomy from the English defines the overt nationalism of the Irish in the twentieth
century. But the Irish political elites of the 1940s and 1950s were often at odds with
nationalism because it was isolationist and, in many ways, prevented Ireland from
attaining economic prosperity.57
O’Faolain’s references to the Easter rebellion in the film play upon this political
and cultural unity of the Irish in opposition to the English. Barty, the narrator in the
film, recounts his experiences to an American visitor in the Shannon airport. O’Faolain
is speaking through Barty’s narrative in highlighting the importance of nationalism.
Easter Sunday is emphasized in two significant scenes both because of its importance as
a religious holiday and for its significance to the nationalists because of the Easter
rebellion in 1916. The first scene occurs when Barty leaves church after Easter Mass
with his horse and carriage and rides from the town back to the farm. Barty describes
the rural town:
the church stood at one end of town. Our farm was at the other. I said
town, well it wasn’t quite a town but rather a village with thatched roofs
on almost every house. The street was deserted on Easter Sunday—the
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village shop and post office all in one was closed. So was the pub, of
course…. remember, it was Easter Sunday and that means a lot to us in
Ireland.58
The statement is ambiguous, and a foreigner could interpret the statement to mean the
importance of the resurrection of Christ, but every Irishman (and woman), would
immediately understand the significance of this statement in terms of Irish history and
nationalism. The second scene occurs when Barty’s father is transformed while
listening to the electrical radio on Easter Sunday when he hears the Irish national
anthem and the radio broadcasts the events of the Easter rebellion in 1916. Barty’s
father was a fighter in the rebellion and Barty looks at his father with love and pride as
they recall the past. O’Faolain plays upon Irish nationalism in this scene and in other
scenes from the film. Barty’s father is emotionally affected when he hears the radio
recalling the Easter rebellion. Barty looks at his father in a proud, loving, and reverent
manner. In the scene where Barty is narrating his story to the American visitor, Gaelic
can be heard from the loudspeakers in Shannon international airport revealing Ireland’s
attempts to get the Irish to learn the native language. This attempt by the Irish to
reclaim their ancestral language demonstrates the fervent nationalism during this time—
after the declaration of the Republic of Ireland.
Religious imagery and religious language are prevalent in the film,
demonstrating the sense of shared cultural and religious nationalism of the Irish. The
religious language and imagery are there to demonstrate the miracle of modernization,
but they also serve as an important cue to bind the Irish in its shared cultural identity.
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But the religious symbology is intertwined with Irish nationalism and, therefore,
undercuts the promotion of modernization and integration with the outside world.
Several Irish officials, like Conor Cruise O’Brien, and some of the intellectual elite, like
Sean O’Faolain, fought against the conflation of Irish nationalism and religion.59 But
the film is nonetheless brimming with religious imagery that is directly tied to Irish
nationalism. The film is constructed as a flashback where Barty recounts his journey to
the Technical Assistance Program where he ultimately reveals the “miracles” that
happened to him. The film begins with Barty O’Brien returning from his technical
assistance training in the United States. He encounters an American businessman at the
Shannon airport and labels his opportunities “miracles.” When he stares at the large
portrait of Christ in his bedroom, he dreams of the plant adjacent to his family’s
farmhouse. Soon after this dream, he is offered an opportunity to take engineering
classes in order to become a skilled laborer. He considers this opportunity to be a
miracle. The final miracle occurs at the end of the film after a string of significant
events. The first event takes place when members of the Electricity Supply Board and
the ECA visit Barty’s engineering school. The men openly discuss the technical
assistance program and express regret about taking candidates only from Dublin. They
talk about how they wish they had recruited someone from the countryside—someone
who would take back to the country the idea of rural electrification—someone who
would know all the problems of Ireland’s small farmers. Barty volunteers and is taken
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back to the American Embassy. He is informed about the Technical Assistance
Program and his role in the electrification of Ireland. Barty is one of several who will
be sent for training. The men ask Barty to promise them that he will come back and
work with them on electrification in Ireland. Barty must also promise his father that he
will return to his father’s farm to work. Barty struggles to find a way to fulfill both of
the promises, which he does by the end of the film when he discovers that his sister has
married a neighbor and they have joined their farms creating an efficient and productive
super farm, thus releasing his obligation to work the family farm for his father. He is
now able to work for the electricity board and bring electrification, industrialization,
and modernization to the Irish people. This is the final miracle.
The Promise of Barty O’Brien reveals the ambivalence of O’Faolain and his
ilk’s perception of the ERP. The film extols the virtues of technical assistance,
electrification, and industrialization. However, this concept of modernity is contrasted
with the glorification of the peasant. The references to the Easter Rebellion signify
Ireland’s continued obsession with nationalism and reflects the difficulty of the Irish
people and Irish officials in the Department of External Affairs to work with ERP
officials and European officials without making the issue of nationalism, specifically
partition, a condition in negotiating international affairs.
The nationalism inherent in the film is prevalent in most Irish art, literature, and
creative media—O’Faolain’s work is no exception. The Promise of Barty O’Brien is
one of many Irish mediums used for advancing Irish nationalism. The most extensive
study of Ireland and film is in the book Cinema and Ireland by Kevin Rockett, Luke
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Gibbons, and John Hill. The book traces the film industry in Ireland from the silent
film era of early 20th century to the 1980s. The book dismisses the negative judgments
of film critics that “are arrived at not on the basis of traditional conceptions of ‘artistic
quality’ and ‘cinematic merit’ but, rather, according to the considerations of political
complexity and formal and cultural self-consciousness.”60 The authors of the book
attempt to look at Irish film without the rose-colored glasses of nationalism and
patriotism, which were indicative of Irish art throughout the 20th century. The authors’
comment,
However, it is not only the received views of cinematic quality which
this discussion puts into question. For it also casts doubt upon the
conventional distinction, perhaps particularly predominant in Ireland,
between the merits of high art, on the one hand, and the shortcomings of
popular culture, on the other. Literature has always enjoyed a privileged
place within Irish culture and, indeed, it may well have been the peculiar
premium placed on the written word which was, in part responsible for
the shortage of enthusiasm for establishing a native film industry.61
The Irish, particularly the artists, viewed any medium which they considered
popular culture to be antithetical to high culture—a long history of having “high art”
representations of Irish culture through literature: stories and poetry. This tradition of
high art comes from the Irish Literary Revival of the 19th and 20th century. The revival
arose out of a need for the expression of an Irish identity and sense of culture in Ireland
that was separate and distinct from English influences. The literature focused on Irish
culture, Celtic mythology and folklore, and on the national heroes in Ireland. Irish
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literary nationalists like William Butler Yeats revealed the antagonisms between
Catholic and Protestant and demonstrated the conflicted politics of his time through
poetry and writings.62 Although certain periods of Irish history, like the revolt in 1798
and the Charles Stewart Parnell’s fight for land and home rule, reveal an “English face
of Irish nationalism” because of the unity between Protestants and Catholics, English
and Irish, for a nationalist cause, the rift between religion and national heritage was the
driving force of most Irish nationalist movements.63 According to sociologist John
Hutchinson, cultural nationalism has been a significant ideological force as a political
option against the state by the intelligentsia. He defines the stages of Irish cultural
nationalism from the first revival of the mid-eighteenth century, the second revival of
the 1820s, and the third revival of the late 1880s that led to the Easter rebellion of 1916
and the war of independence.64 Irish cultural nationalism is often political and
religious, but it also glorifies nature. The presence of farms and small villages in
Ireland distinguishes it from England. Some historians have suggested that the
“natural” may have survived longer in Ireland because of a lack of development.
Despite forest clearances, bog reclamations, and consolidation of some villages,
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southern portions of Ireland escaped deep human penetration.65 Irish nationalists tried
to distinguish between the differences of the outside world, namely England, and the
importance of Irish political, religious, and agrarian life.
Because of the emphasis on extolling the values of Irish life by Irish artists and
writers as a result of the Irish cultural revival of the nineteenth century, Irish film did
not become important in the representation of the realities of Irish life until later in the
20th century because of a lack of funding, lack of government support, and this view
that it was tied to popular culture and therefore not worthy of artistic expression.
Documentaries became particularly important in the 1930s and 1940s. Several
documentaries during this period revealed the realism of poverty, unemployment and
lack of industrialism in Ireland. One example is the documentary The Irish Question
which was made in 1944. The film is an example of harsh realism in that it depicts an
extremely rural and agricultural country with children running barefoot to school, and
yet, it is still defined by the romantic view of Ireland and the Irish people as different
and distinct. The film even claims to justify the reasons why Ireland remained neutral
during World War II in that
Ireland’s unhappy history under British rule was an important factor in
Eire’s decision to remain neutral, a decision which the freedom-loving
nations of the world found difficult to comprehend. But those who
would understand this proud and sensitive people today and in the future
should look, not to logic, but to the poetry of the Irish.66
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The narration furthers the stereotype that the Irish are not defined by logic, but by some
mystical connection to poetry and art. It also explains Ireland’s neutrality in terms of its
long ties to Britain. The film explains that Ireland became neutral because the country
had already been at war from the time of Norman supplantation of the Irish in the
Middle Ages. Ireland had only recently thrown off the yoke of English oppression and
could not afford to enter into the arena of international war in the 1940s. While Irish
neutrality is somewhat understandable during World War II, the notion that the Irish
people were too proud and sensitive and, therefore, must retreat from the new world
order was patronizing and unrealistic. The complex interplay of postwar politics: ERP,
economic recovery, diplomacy, NATO, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—forced Irish leaders to confront the
new world order of postwar politics.67 The Irish could not afford to retreat into their
poetry and romanticized history and exist in this new world of political and economic
integration.
One of several documentaries utilized as political propaganda, Our Country,
was created under the guise of a civic film, which would take a realistic look at Ireland.
The film was created in 1947, and was criticized by Éamon de Valera, head of the
Fianna Fáil party who were being challenged by the newly created Clann na Poblachta
party. De Valera used the film as a target in order to undermine Clann na Poblachta
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because they were challenging the Fianna Fáil party’s sixteen year run as head of the
Irish government. The film is significant as a piece of propaganda because
the film was under the banner of the Irish Civic Films in a fortnight
during December 1947. Irish scenes were intercut by direct camera
statements by three of the Clann’s principal members, Seán MacBride,
Noel Hartnett and Noel Browne….Our country, it is declared at the
film’s opening, is your country. But the short, astringent film lists the
failures of Fianna Fáil’s 16 years in office: emigration continues (this
‘slow bleeding death of the nation’) as queues at Dublin’s UK permit
office are shown; an unused plough highlights the failure to increase
agricultural production; a shoeless working-class boy is contrasted with
images of imported luxury goods; a shop’s empty shelves and signs of
‘No Eggs’, ‘No Bacon’, emphasize the shortages of even essential
foodstuffs.68
This depiction of a realistic view of Ireland was merely a propaganda piece for Clann na
Poblachta even though the film did touch upon some of the key issues facing Ireland at
the time: unemployment, emigration, and poverty. MacBride replaced De Valera in
1948 precisely because he and Clann na Poblachta ran such a rich political campaign
through publicity and propaganda. MacBride was particularly interested in producing
“objective, precise, authoritarian information for the foreign reader in order to create a
climate of interest in, and sympathy for, Irish affairs—particularly his perception of the
injustice of partition”.69 When MacBride became head of External Affairs in 1948, his
knowledge and appreciation of publicity and propaganda became important in
implementing propaganda at the urging of the ECA.
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Sean O’Faolain was an Irish nationalist and, at the same time, he questioned
the zealous fervor and isolationist tendencies of his peers, but nevertheless, his writing
was characterized by an ambivalent and complex attitude towards Irish nationalism.
O’Faolain was an Irishman, a Catholic, and born in the city of Cork in 1900. He had
witnessed the turbulence of the rebellion in 1916 and the Irish civil war that followed in
the 1920s.70 He represented the generation of writers after the Irish Renaissance.
Unlike the literary romanticism and idealism of the Irish people during the literary
resurgence of the 19th and 20th centuries, O’Faolain’s worked was characterized by a
kind of ambivalence regarding the Irish ideal because
in the early Renaissance, these ideas were expressed in heroic form, as in
much of the work of AE and the early Yeats. Gradually they were
subjected to ironic scrutiny and even parody…yet, these ironical
treatments were not indifferent dismissals of Irish idealism; in their
questioning way they were spiritual extensions of that idealism. In a
1934 essay entitled ‘The Emancipation of Irish Writers,’ O’Faolain
remarks: ‘Irish literature, as I feel it, has always been seeking escapes
from the shattering of its ideals.’ This statement touches upon inherited
idealism, realization of its failures, and yet the young Irish writer’s desire
to be saved from idealism itself.71
O’Faolain’s rejection of Irish idealism transcended his writing. He also ventured into
politics and journalism when he became a sort of cultural spokesman as creator and
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editor of the newspaper The Bell in the 1940s. As editor of The Bell, he “provided a
haven of encouragement for a generation of young Irish writers suffering from antiintellectualism at home and, because of Irish neutrality during the war, dire marketing
consequences abroad.”72 O’Faolain understood the complexities of a postwar world
regarding trade, integration with Europe, foreign policy, and the importance of defense.
The same year the The Promise of Barty O’Brien was released, O’Faolain
became embroiled in a controversy regarding United States’ intentions concerning the
Marshall Plan. In January of 1951, an article was published in the Irish Times regarding
the Technical Assistance Program. This article prompted a response in the form of a
letter to all major Irish newspapers from Louie Bennett, an Irish trade unionist. In her
letter, Bennett questioned the intentions of the ECA’s altruism in giving aid to Ireland.
Bennett wrote her letter after a major transition in U.S. focus regarding the Marshall
Plan. After the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in 1950, the U.S. focused less
on the economic recovery of Europe and more on the defense of non-communist
nations. The outbreak of the Korean War “had radically transformed transatlantic
relations as western rearmament rather than recovery became the first priority of the
Truman administration.”73 In her letter, Bennett claims that “war-preparations are now
the all-absorbing and dominant interest of the ruling authorities in America….are we
drifting into such entanglements, or is it the deliberate policy of our government to link
72
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Ireland with the U.S.A. in external affairs? We are made aware that we are outside the
Atlantic Pact only because of partition. But America can provide the back door to the
Pact.”74 Ireland refused to participate in NATO as long as the United Kingdom retained
Northern Ireland under their control. Ireland used the issue of partition as a condition to
join NATO, but the key players were not concerned whether a small state like Ireland
joined or not.
O’Faolain responded to Bennett and other “like minded left-wing intellectuals”
in The Bell by using the letter as a “polemic against the automatic knee-jerk antiAmericanism among Irish intellectuals.”75 O’Faolain created the term
“Autoantiamericanism” or “Auto-anti” to illustrate this knee-jerk reaction against U.S.
motives. The debate between the auto-antis and O’Faolain made its way into the
American consciousness when his writing was reprinted in an article in Time Magazine
on May 14, 1951. O’Faolain asks the question,
What are the sources, motives or unconscious origins of AntiAmericanism? First I would put British influences…[like] The New
Statesman. [It is] the British Bible of every washed-up Liberal, soured
Conservative, lapsed Catholic, half-baked grammar school intellectual,
the new technical boys whose knowing twang you hear on every bus,
every manic-depressive Orwellite, fissurated Koestlerite, prehistoric
Fabian, antique Keir Hardyite, flaming anti-Roman Catholic, like…and
every other unhappy misfit, pink and pacifist, whose sole prophylactic
against despair….Marshall Aid to the end of 1950 has cost every crude,
rude, grasping, vulgar, selfish racketeering American fifteen shillings
($2.10) a week out of his back pocket.76
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O’Faolain challenges the auto-antis by claiming that their anti-Americanism comes
from their own prejudices and preoccupations. Most importantly, O’Faolain challenges
them by implying that their anti-Americanism is derived directly from the British. The
idea that the Irish would derive or copy anything from the British in 1951, just a few
years after officially declaring Ireland as a republic, would seem absurd and insulting to
the Irish. However, O’Faolain was trying to make an important point by reminding the
Irish of their own ties to the United States. After all, the U.S. was a former British
colony just like Ireland. O’Faolain “attributed such ungratefulness on the part of the
Irish public to their reliance on Britain as the primary source of international news.”77
Bennett’s retaliatory mimic of O’Faolain’s statement above demonstrates the annoyance
with any claims that the Irish are influenced by British anti-Americanism. She asserts,
“I am anti-British, anti-American, anti-Russian and pro-Irish.”78 Bennett is also
representative of a theme in Irish culture of the 20th century of pursuing a non-aligned
third way for Ireland between the huge powers of communism versus capitalism.
Bennett saw the struggle between the U.S.S.R. and the United States as a struggle of
evil superpower conflict. She envisioned Ireland as a David in a sea of Goliaths
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struggling to maintain its position as a country concerned with Christianity, humanity,
and anti-materialism.79
Another critic of O’Faolain, the writer Hubert Butler, also represented the
predominant left-wing intellectual view that O’Faolain was advocating a policy of
cooperation with the United States, which would ultimately undermine peace. Butler
argued that intellectuals (like O’Faolain and Butler) should “preach universal love and
the abolition of frontiers and other spiritual things, while it is the duty of the state to
punish him and confine itself to the realist task of defense.”80 Butler believed
O’Faolain was a traitor against his own kind—the writer intellectual—because
O’Faolain had abandoned his lofty pursuits of peace and spirituality by venturing into
politics and foreign affairs.
O’Faolain became increasingly disillusioned by these attacks from the Irish leftwing nationalists. He had originally set up The Bell to provide a kind of dialogue on
Irish culture and current affairs. However, because of the debate between his critics and
himself, he expressed an
obvious annoyance with an almost automatic rejection by many Irish
nationalists of any form of foreign involvement in Irish domestic affairs
even if they are as well-intentioned and potentially beneficial as the
American ERP grants. By claiming the high moral ground, in his view
many Irish observers displayed an extreme naivety about international
affairs or the true nature of the Cold War.81
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What is interesting about O’Faolain’s debate is that he was remarkably silent about
what the Irish government specifically should do about the current domestic and
international situation.
O’Faolain’s ambiguous feelings about the Irish can be found in a book he
wrote in 1949, two years before the film The Promise of Barty O’Brien debuted. The
book The Irish: A Character Study, was written as a reaction to the Irish nationalist’s
sense of himself or herself as distinct, special, and therefore different and apart from the
rest of the world. In the preface to the book, O’Faolain explains
this book is not a history of political events, although some political
events are described briefly in the course of the main narrative. It is, in
effect, a creative history of the growth of a racial mind; or one might call
it a psychological history; or, if the term were not far too large and
grandiose, the story of the development of a national Irish civilization;
although what has happened in the Irish mind is not an undisturbed local
expansion but a complex process of assimilation at the end of which
Ireland enters, with her own distinctive qualifications, into the great
general stream of European culture.82
O’Faolain attempted to dispel the myth that the Irish are racially and culturally pure.
He traced the roots of Irish culture, the mythology derived from the Irish kings, the
influence and inculcation of the Celts, the Vikings, the Normans and the Anglo-Saxons
in order to dispel the myth of cultural and racial purity in Ireland. O’Faolain claimed,
“all our histories are nationalist, patriotic, political, sentimental.”83 O’Faolain expressed
ambivalence about this Irish experience of their past—he both praised certain aspects of
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Irish history but also condemned the idealization of Irish nationalism. He described the
rebel tradition of Ireland in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century: Wolfe Tone,
Daniel O’Connell, the Young Irelanders, Fenianism, and Charles Stewart Parnell.
O’Faolain claimed “that all these men deprived Ireland of as much as they gave to it:
They choked the critical side of their minds, they were good rebels in proportion as they
were bad revolutionaries, so that their passion for change and their vision of change
never pierced to organic change.”84 O’Faolain took a great risk in challenging the
iconic figures of the rebels in Irish history. He also attacked other facets of Irish culture
and history, including Irish literature, which he claimed had two main problems—
provincialism and nationalism. O’Faolain explained
the dangers need no underlining. Herbert Read speaks of the writer’s
roots being sunk deeper in the soil where the outlook is confined, and
Irish literature amply illustrates what he means; but Irish literature also
illustrates what he means by the confined outlook, for this word “soil”
will readily suggest to us how soon a yawning boredom may follow the
constant repetition of over-familiar peasant motifs. One need go no
further than the Abbey Theatre to see how easily this repetition exhausts
the soil, and our interest.85
He cautioned writers against clinging to provincialism and the idealism of
nationalism. He claimed that
man is a thinking animal, and writers are supposed to think more
intensely than other men, and when they have depicted all the usual local
rural themes—land-hunger, match-making, sexual-repression, the
farcical side of village-life, political jobbery, nationalist fervours and
nationalist disillusions and so on—they naturally want to turn, with the
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turn of their thoughts, to those other issues which the world’s wider stage
brings to their notice.86
O’Faolain was acutely aware of the problems that provincialism and nationalism
posed for the Irish people. However, at the same time, he was part of this
tradition of cultural nationalism and it is apparent in his screenplay of Barty.
The issue of nationalism revealed the contradictions in Irish society and
identity during this period. Modernization Theorists in the 1950s argued that
nationalism and the formation of nation-states implied inevitable processes of
assimilation. In many ways, Ireland was a newly formed nation-state in the twentieth
century, but it was still very much economically and culturally tied to the United
Kingdom. Miroslav Hroch emphasized the role of regional elites and the uneven
economic development within states, arguing that local elites whose interests were
threatened by larger markets and global forces often encouraged the spread of
nationalist sentiment to protect those interests.87 Hroch argued that nationalist
movements developed in three stages:
First, nationalist movements assume an apolitical, folkloric character;
second, they are taken up by literate elites wishing to inculcate the
“national idea” and organize the masses; and third, nationalist
movements then truly gain mass-based support.88
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The development of Ireland in the nineteenth and twentieth century seems to follow this
model. However, many, including the cultural elite like O’Faolain, had a different,
more progressive, less nationalistic vision of Ireland. The romanticization of
agricultural, peasant life contradicted the goals of O’Faolain and forward-thinking
members of the Department of Foreign Affairs. While state formation and politics form
a major impetus for nationalism, so do national consciousness, identity, and symbols.89
This period of nationalism and the ERP reveal the struggle and contradictions inherent
in the film The Promise of Barty O’Brien, which both extols Irish life and also
advocates the modernization and industrialization promoted by the Americans.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Working Together? Ireland’s Ambivalent Relationship with the
United Kingdom and the United States

The issue of Irish nationalism in The Promise of Barty O’Brien and other media
reveals the complex history of Ireland in relation to the United Kingdom. In many ways
the relationship between Ireland and the United States was also complicated because of
the historical connection between the Irish people and Irish Americans, but Irish
neutrality during the war and the “special relationship” between the United Kingdom
and the United States reinforced tension in Ireland’s official relationship with the U.S.90
Ireland’s complex economic and historically colonial relationship with the United
Kingdom became an issue concerning Ireland’s search for integration and
modernization with regard to ERP. The Irish increasingly identified with being
European (rather than only Irish) and, therefore, considered their nation culturally
superior to the crass commercialism of the United States, thus compounding the
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complicated relationship between the countries. The perception of U.S. dominance also
created tension between European nations and the U.S. Because the U.S. was a
superpower during this period, the simple nature of its ascendancy created a sense that
the country was trying to dominate the world even if this was not the intention of U.S.
officials.91
Despite the shared connection between the United States and Ireland, in many
ways their relationship became strained in the 1940s and 50s. Ireland’s neutrality
during the war became an obstacle to what type of aid, if any, Ireland would receive
from Marshall Aid funds. The concept of neutrality has always been a major
component of modern, Republican Irish thought. Irish neutrality became an aspiration
of many key Irish officials and it arose out of the spirit of the Locarno Treaties in 1925.
Éamon de Valera believed strongly in neutrality and, despite antagonism toward the
British, he also believed that Ireland should not be used as a base to attack the United
Kingdom.92 This policy of neutrality, which became official during the event of World
War II when both Britain and the United States went to war, led Ireland to become a
pariah state after the war. Since Ireland’s economic interests were linked to Britain and
the two economies were interdependent, with Ireland disproportionately reliant on
British markets and imports, Irish neutrality was not economically justifiable, despite
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being morally justifiable for many. United States officials during the Truman and
Eisenhower administrations held a certain amount of contempt for Ireland since it did
not participate in the war.93
The strained relationship between the United States and Ireland regarding
neutrality is visible in the correspondence between U.S. ECA officials and Irish leaders.
Carrigan, the Chief of the ECA Mission to Ireland and an Irish descendent, attempted to
smooth over the tension between U.S. and Irish officials when an article appeared in the
Irish Independent stating that Ireland was included in ERP because she was an
economic boon to Britain despite her neutrality during the war.94 Con Cremin,
Assistant Secretary of External Affairs, submitted the minutes of a meeting after the
paper came out to Carrigan voicing his concern that Ireland would be treated unjustly
and unfairly because of its neutrality. The minutes state,
It is difficult to see why Mr. Lawrence should single out Ireland for
remarks of the kind attributed to him as compared with, e.g. Sweden,
which is also receiving a loan at the present time. The peculiarity of
these remarks is enhanced when one remembers that the Bizone is
receiving ECA Aid. Finally, to choose the moment of signature of a
Loan Agreement to imply that a special exception was being made in
favour of Ireland, although neutral in the war, seems particularly mal á
propos and is not calculated to lessen the risk of misrepresentation and
resentment among the general public.95
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Irish officials were wary about the ways in which the United States would implement
the ERP funds. The correspondence between U.S. officials and Irish officials
underscores the minefield of diplomacy and negotiation involved in order to get Ireland
on board with ERP.
The Irish perception of American intentions was also complicated. Many
Europeans, including the Irish, liked to distinguish themselves from Americans, who
they viewed as materialistic and uncultured. Many perceived the Americans’ attitude
towards Europe as condescending. They resented the idea that the United States was
elite, more progressive than Europe, and generally superior. The idea of “American
Exceptionalism”, the belief that the U.S. was not only unique but also superior, guided
U.S. policymaking in the twentieth century. There are different types of
exceptionalism, but the more dominant strand is that of the missionary nation, as
represented by the ideas of manifest destiny, imperialism, leader of the free world, and
the new world order. Europeans, including the Irish, resented the United States because
of U.S. perceptions of superiority over Europe. The U.S. not only exported foreign aid,
but also American culture. American exceptionalism is one of the most important
concepts underlying modern theories of American cultural identity.96 This belief in the
messianic role of American policy and culture alienated and angered Europeans. W.B.
Stanford of Dublin lambasted the Americans’ verdict that ERP productivity was too
slow in relation to European unity at the third session of the Consultative Assembly of
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the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. Stanford emphasized the cultural and spiritual
differences between Europeans and the United States. He asked if
the Americans would like all the European Gothic cathedrals to be
streamlined into functional skyscrapers. Would they like Shakespeare
and Dante to be reduced to official condensations in some “Reader’s
Digest?” Cultural and religious matters, he said, were as dynamic in
European affairs as economics and sociology.97
The tension between officials such as Stanford and the U.S. ECA representatives is
indicative of the complicated relationships between the nations. The Irish Workers’
League threw a leaflet at the American Ambassador to Ireland as he passed through the
streets of Dublin, that read “the American imperialists and their British stooges are
doing everything to involve all countries in their devilish aims”.98 An article in the Irish
Independent revealed the cultural differences between the U.S. and Europe: “the
American representatives do not seem to understand what it means to be a European.
They do not seem to understand what we live for, and, sometimes, die for.”99 Men like
Carrigan had to navigate the minefield of U.S. and Irish relations during the
implementation of the ERP. Although Carrigan was well-liked by Irish officials
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because of his good nature and his Irish heritage, many Irish leaders, like Stanford,
distrusted U.S. intentions and the materialistic culture of America.
While Irish leaders were suspicious of U.S. intentions with regard to ERP,
everyday Irish workers were also concerned about the implementation of the ERP. In
1950, the Irish Workers’ League threw leaflets at the American Ambassador as he was
walking through the streets of Dublin. At least one young man was arrested in the
incident. The leaflet was a call to action against U.S. imperialism. Interestingly, the
pamphlet makes a distinction between U.S. officials and the American people. At the
beginning of the leaflet, it states “greetings to the great American people—but not to the
men of Wall Street.”100 The pamphlet urges the Irish to fight the American imperialists
and the British stooges and claims “we want peace, improved living conditions and a
genuine fight to end Partition without conditions.”101 While many Irish, including the
Irish Workers’ League, were wary of American and British intentions, Ireland was
nonetheless dependent on both nations to support its economy.
Although Ireland tended to distance itself politically and culturally from the
British, it was still economically tied to Britain, but this posed problems for Irish
officials who, now that Ireland was officially politically independent of the British,
wanted economic independence as well. Yet British involvement in the Marshall Plan
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became a major factor in Ireland’s decision to economically integrate with Europe since
the Irish economy was so dependent on the British economy. The ECA Loan Director,
Mr. Lawrence, stated in Washington that despite her wartime neutrality, “Eire was
included in the ERP because she was ‘almost an agricultural adjunct’ of Britain.”102
Ireland’s economic ties and agricultural exports to Britain were precisely why the ECA
provided Marshall Plan funding to Ireland in the first place.
Contrary to most people’s perception of the Marshall Plan, the impetus for the
plan was not solely economic, but also institutional and political in nature. The goals of
the Marshall planners were much more ambitious than economic recovery. They
wanted to create a postwar world that would not fall victim either to the extremism of
the inter war years or the scourge of communism.103 Britain’s decision to participate in
the Marshall Plan had profound consequences for Ireland. The policy of the Marshall
Plan proved to be a pivotal moment in Britain’s postwar relations not only with the
United States, but also with Europe and, in particular, Ireland.
However, the British attitude towards integration was ambivalent at best.
Because of the “special relationship” between Britain and the United States, Britain
anticipated that they would benefit even more from the Marshall Plan than their
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European contemporaries and were sorely disappointed when the Marshall planners
treated them no differently than France, for example. British Foreign Secretary Ernest
Bevin informed Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William Clayton that
“he had strong reservations about America’s new policy of providing aid to Western
Europe as a regional bloc, arguing that this would effectively mean that Britain would
be treated as ‘just another European country’”.104 In fact, Britain’s Economic Policy
Committee (EPC) created an ambiguous policy called the “doctrine of limited liability”
also known as the “recognition of the point of no return.”105 This policy of “limited
liability” was Britain’s way of reassuring itself that it would not become involved in the
economic affairs of continental Europe beyond the point of no return. However, no one
could pinpoint when or where exactly the point of no return could occur. The doctrine
of limited liability did become an issue in Britain’s involvement in the OEEC. The
OEEC was created in 1948 for the purpose of administering the Marshall Plan in
Europe. The purpose of the organization was to restructure a war torn Europe, but it
also helped integrate European economic policies. The OEEC provided the foundation
for economic integration and, to some extent, political integration when Americans
Averill Harriman and Paul Hoffman decided to appoint a director general and conduct
ministerial meetings. Harriman served as U.S. Coordinator of the European Recovery
Program, one among many political positions where he had great influence, and Paul
Hoffman served as the first administrator of the ECA.
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The British strongly objected to this notion of economic integration, much less
political integration in any form. Interestingly, American efforts to create a political
organization in the OEEC failed, but the experience of the OEEC laid the foundation for
future institutions of integration such as the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) and the EEC.106 The problem of economic and political integration was evident
throughout the latter twentieth century. Even during the establishment of the European
Union, nationalism emerged despite the globalization of the European economy.
National identities proved to be an obstacle to European integration even at the end of
the twentieth century.107
Britain’s continual refusal to be integrated with continental Europe came to a
head with regard to the 1950 Schuman Plan, an integrationist plan developed by France
that would exclude the British. The French, recognizing that Britain was a reluctant
participant in European integration, developed an integrationist plan without the
country. The Schuman Plan was created to facilitate an incremental liberalization of
trade and market integration by combining the French economic and military security.
Therefore, the first step towards supra-nationalism in Europe arose from a French need
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to secure its military and economic interests in German and French coal and steel
production.108
Britain’s refusal to participate in the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) was a crucial turning point in Britain’s postwar history. This was the first time
that Britain declared publicly that it was against a federal Europe. Many historians
claim that British officials could not have made a greater attempt to commit to
integration in the OEEC and the ECSC because they were obviously no longer the
powerful global empire of the prewar era. However, it was not unthinkable that
Britain’s empire had vanished in 1947 when the nation still held worldwide interests
across the globe.109 Although it was probable that Britain could regain its world power
status after the war, the doctrine of limited liability should have been reevaluated—
especially by the time of the Shuman Plan. Even though Britain was a reluctant
participant in European integration, its participation was significant because the country
agreed to work not only with the United States but also with continental Europe.
The Marshall Plan was important because disparate European nations were able
to work together and because it was a joint endeavor between Europe and the United
States. Europe was able to garner much needed economic aid and stability after the
war. The United States benefited from the plan because it guaranteed that communism
via the Soviet Union would not creep in the ERP countries’ quarters. However,
American leaders underestimated the power of a united Europe. While not all, several
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U.S. officials believed Europe was comprised of backward, conquered people who
desperately needed assistance and guidance to survive in the brave new world of the
U.S. and Soviet superpowers.110 This U.S. perception of Europeans further complicated
Britain and Ireland’s relationship with the Americans. But the issue of partition and the
legacy of colonialism exacerbated an already strained relationship between British and
Irish officials.
What distinguished the Marshall Plan from earlier American aid programs was
that the planners decided to get rid of the idea of case-by-case aid. Instead, they
adopted the idea of a coherent west European strategic concept. Even though, by 1947,
the United States had spent over $9 billion in a variety of aid programs on the European
continent, European industrial and agricultural production was still much less than that
of the prewar era.111 The strategy of this coherent economic aid was deeply rooted in
the foundations of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The idea of a coherent west European strategy included the European nations working
together toward some type of integration. Because Ireland’s economy was bound to
Britain, the reluctance of the United Kingdom in accepting integration proved another
obstacle to Irish leaders, particularly in the Department of External Affairs, who wanted
to pursue integration with Europe. But the idea of a united Europe was an evolving
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concept and the terms of European integration and European unity were widely
interpreted and loosely applied.112 United States officials believed that the Marshall
Plan would act as insurance, essentially preventing communism from enveloping
Europe. American officials believed that some type of integration of Europe was
needed to secure an undivided Europe and protect the western European countries
against the encroachment of communism. However, the interpretation of the word
integration varied greatly.113 Europeans were excited about the economic advantages of
integration if it meant the removing of trade barriers, removing tariffs, and allowing the
free flow of goods among the devastated countries of Europe.
Ireland’s role in the Marshall Plan reveals its complicated and often strained
relationship with Britain. In 1948 the British head of the Finance Division of the
Treasury, Otto Clark, claimed “it is more important to us that Eire should receive
adequate aid than it is for Eire herself.”114 In his statement, Clark reveals the need for
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Ireland’s economy to flourish—particularly agricultural production and exportation of
agriculture to Britain—since the economies of both countries were so co-dependent. In
February of 1948, a coalition government led by John A. Costello replaced the Fianna
Fáil government led by Éamon de Valera. Seán MacBride, part of this new coalition
and leader of the radical republican Clan na Poblachta party, became the new minister
for the Department of External Affairs. MacBride immediately set out to distance
Ireland from Britain and tackle the issue of partition, which became linked to the
politics of Ireland’s role in the ERP. Because of Ireland’s historical dependency on
trade with Britain, Irish leaders looked to Marshall Aid as an option to close the dollar
deficit after the suspension of the dollar-sterling convertibility in August of 1947.115
The ECA had decided only to offer loans to countries that it assessed could repay the
loan without difficulty. Irish leaders wanted to bypass this requirement by convincing
the ECA that Ireland could not repay any loans once it could no longer draw from the
sterling area dollar pool. But ECA officials rejected this argument since currency
convertibility could not be achieved as earlier planned. Indeed, the total sum of
Marshall Aid to Ireland was $148 million and only $18 million of that money was
issued in grants. 116 The historian Raymond J. Raymond argued that Ireland received
more loans than grants than any other ERP country because of its neutrality during the
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war.117 Ireland was in a difficult position regarding the ERP loans: the government was
confronted with the complication of its economic links to Britain and the IrishAmerican Lobby in the U.S., who were attempting to make partition the central issue in
Irish affairs with regard to Britain and the U.S. To make matters worse, the Americans
enlisted British assistance by asking them to threaten to block Ireland’s access to the
sterling area dollar pool if it continued to finance its dollar deficit by running down its
sterling balances and, in turn, the British took advantage of the dispute between Irish
and ECA officials by supporting Irish officials’ cause to get grants instead of loans.118
If Britain could have united with Ireland in its cause to receive grants by implying that
Ireland was not in a position to pay back the loans, this might have furthered British
foreign economic policy with regard to the sterling area.
But, what finally distanced Ireland and Britain with regard to the Marshall Plan
was the conflict over the increasing economic integration of Europe when the
Americans attempted to raise the status of the OEEC by increasing the power of the
executive powers in the Council of Ministers by appointing a strong director general,
the Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak.119 MacBride became extremely
supportive of Spaak and the increasing power of the OEEC in integrating Europe, much
to the dismay of the British and French officials who believed Spaak was a firebrand
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and unqualified for such a high position in the OEEC and, therefore, were not in favor
of his appointment.
Interestingly, when MacBride initially took office, there was no indication that
he would become such a staunch supporter of European unity. One of the reasons
MacBride supported integration was he saw an opportunity to garner American support
to use against the British. MacBride was attempting to make Ireland a greater player in
the international arena by his many policy proposals in the OEEC such as increasing
Irish exports like agriculture and wool, but he also wanted to use this opportunity to
gain American support of anti-partition. It is ironic that this proposal came from a
country so concerned with self-sufficiency and so dependent on a single export
market.120 But, this is also indicative of Ireland’s struggle for identity in a postwar
world—desiring a stake in the international economy, and, at the same time, struggling
to protect her own national economy in the face of partition and debt from ECA loans.
When Ireland did not join the North Atlantic alliance because of the issue of partition, it
cost Ireland the remaining $1 million of technical assistance and $18 million of
potential grants as Marshall Aid turned into military assistance because of the outbreak
of the Korean War in June 1950. Ireland became less and less strategic in American
foreign policy.
The complex relationship with Britain and the United States illustrates Ireland’s
struggle with how, and to what extent, the country would economically and politically
integrate with Europe. This tension is prevalent in the Department of External Affairs’
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rise to a position of power in the postwar world. The ambivalence regarding
relinquishing the old nationalistic, conservative means of living can also be found in the
tension between the Department of External Affairs and the Department of Finance.
The complex relationships between nations, and within the nation of Ireland,
demonstrate the problems of integration in the years after the war. These complex
relationships and the problems of working together were compounded by Irish officials
desire to inject nationalism in their promotion of the ERP in order to highlight the
problems of partition. Like O’Faolain’s struggle between nationalism and European
integration in his writings and, specifically, in The Promise of Barty O’Brien, Irish
officials also could not divorce themselves from Irish nationalism, which was ever
present in Irish thinking and in international diplomacy.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Rise of the Department of External Affairs:
Pushing for European Integration and Irish Nationalism
The traditionally accepted historical analysis of Ireland’s involvement in the
Marshall Plan is that Ireland was a reluctant participant in the ERP. Many officials in
government were wary of U.S. intentions regarding Marshall Aid and Irish leaders were
concerned about U.S. hegemony in the postwar era. They were also wary about
economic and political integration with Europe. Despite the tendency of many Irish
leaders to fear outside aid and influence, a group of Irish officials in the Department of
External Affairs were actually proponents of foreign aid and even European integration.
The Department of External Affairs became a major participant during postwar
diplomacy and participation in the OEEC. The Department of External Affairs rose
from a small department to a major player in the game of distributing ERP aid.
However, the Department’s push for integration and cooperation with the United States
was ultimately limited by Irish conservatism and nationalism. Like Barty’s struggle
between traditional, national values and the desire to train in the technical assistance
program in the United States, Irish officials in the Department of External Affairs were
excited about the unique opportunity of ERP, but also like Barty, Irish nationalism and,
specifically, partition consistently emerges in Irish thought and policy.
The Department of External Affairs was essentially the foreign affairs and
diplomatic office for Ireland. External Affairs was created in 1919 as the Department
of Foreign Affairs to advance Ireland’s political interests. In 1922, the department was
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renamed the Department of External Affairs and it would retain that name until 1971,
when the department reclaimed its original name of Department of Foreign Affairs.
Initially, the Department was primarily concerned with political interests, but after the
implementation of the ERP and the opportunities of ECA funding and European
economic integration, leaders in the department increasingly had to grapple with both
political and economic issues. The opportunities afforded by the European Recovery
Plan and the change in leadership of the Department of External Affairs from a more
conservative group of individuals to a more progressive group of charismatic foreign
affairs officers increased the importance and role of the department during this time.
The Department of External Affairs’ desire to accept foreign aid from the ECA
conflicted with the more conservative tendencies of the Department of Finance.121
While the Department of External Affairs managed diplomacy and foreign affairs, the
Department of Finance in Ireland administered the public finances of the country and
the collection and expenditures of the revenue of Ireland. The Department of Finance
initially rejected the loans offered by the ERP and, instead, asked for grants.
Department of Finance officials mistrusted the idea that Marshall aid would save
Ireland from economic destruction and, therefore, they believed that if Irish officials
were going to accept any aid at all, it would be in the form of grants and not loans. The
conservatism of the Department of Finance was directly contrasted with the
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personalities in the Department of External Affairs. The “acerbic” governor of the
Central Bank, Joseph Brennan, and Secretary of the Department of Finance James
McElligott argued against accepting any aid except if the money was given in grants.
They argued that Ireland did not have the dollars to pay back the ECA. McElligott
retorted the Irish “cannot expect any measure of salvation from the Marshall Plan.”122
The tension between the two departments reveals the desire for External Affairs to take
advantage of ERP opportunities versus the conservative realism of Finance to secure
Ireland’s market in a tenuous economy.
The departments displayed vastly different attitudes, but it was the important
role that individuals played in the acceptance and implementation of the Marshall Plan
that made the Department of External Affairs unique among Irish government agencies
at the time. The role of the European Recovery Plan in Ireland was important because it
allowed the Department of External Affairs to essentially come to the fore in the Irish
administrative system once Éamon de Valera was replaced by Seán MacBride as
minister and F.H. Boland was appointed secretary. Although, in the short term, Irish
leaders in departments like Finance and conservative Irish leaders resisted European
integration, the increasing importance of the role of External Affairs in its duties to the
ECA allowed it to provide a foundation for eventual integration in the EEC.123 The
need for diplomats and foreign affairs agents to administer and cooperate with the ECA
elevated the importance of the Department of External Affairs and caused the
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department to expand during this period. External Affairs would also play an important
role in Ireland’s history because it was comprised of some brilliant and dynamic
individuals.
The Department of External Affairs increased both in size and importance
from 1945 to the 1950s. Although Ireland experienced six years of neutrality during
World War II, the Marshall Plan provided a way to force External Affairs’ operations
into foreign economic policy when it was invited to join in the planning and
implementation of ERP resources. Although the focus of the leaders of External Affairs
was not only on integration at this point, this expansion and the changes in leadership in
the department created the beginning of a more international outlook among Irish
diplomats and foreign affairs leaders.124 This European (though not necessarily
integrationist) outlook began to emerge in the Department of External Affairs following
World War II.125 Michael Kennedy describes a “brainstorming” conference held by
External Affairs on Tuesday, September 11, in 1945, which was an unprecedented event
in External Affairs’ short history and marked the beginning of the department’s postwar
expansion. Minister of External Affairs Éamon de Valera led a conference that brought
together at secretary level the key actors who would oversee Ireland’s slow engagement
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with Europe during the late 1940s and 1950s.126 Part of the discussion was the
significant role that diplomats could play in highlighting the importance of Ireland and
its struggles. J.P. Walshe, Secretary of External Affairs at the time, referred to Irish
diplomats as “Apostles for this country” who should look for every opportunity,
whether by talks or lectures or personal contacts, to do the work for which they have
been sent abroad.127 Although Walshe would remain secretary for a short time because
of his health (he was replaced by F.H. Boland in 1946), his words reveal the desire for
Irish External Affairs to increase the level of diplomatic activity abroad.128 However, it
is clear that after the war, External Affairs was not entirely sure about the place it would
occupy in the new world order.129
Two important changes in the Department of External Affairs affected
Ireland’s involvement in the Marshall Plan and built upon the desire of the 1945
conference attendees to include a place for Ireland in the post World War II new world
order. The first change was the appointment of F.H. Boland to Secretary of the
Department of External Affairs in 1946. Walshe and Boland had extremely different
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personalities and experience in international affairs.130 Boland’s experience in
international affairs placed him in a unique position where he could utilize his
diplomatic experience to earn respect for Ireland in the international community.
Boland was considered an outstanding diplomat during his stint in External Affairs. It
was his experience in the department’s League of Nations section from 1934 to 1936
and his experience from 1936 to 1938 as head of the foreign trade section of the
Department of Industry and Commerce that allowed him the knowledge and expertise to
be able to establish a place for Ireland in the new economic and international order in
Europe. These experiences allowed him to understand diplomacy and international
commerce, which would have a profound affect on Irish foreign policy. Boland also
created a more complex interface between senior and middle management in the
department, expanded Ireland’s overseas missions, appointed (for the first time) a
diplomat at the rank of ambassador (Walshe as diplomat to the Vatican in 1946),
strengthened the Irish high commissioner’s office in London, and strengthened the Irish
Consulate in New York in preparations for Ireland’s eventual inclusion in the United
Nations.131 When Ireland failed to gain admission to the United Nations in August of
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1946 following a Soviet veto, the department began to reorient their foreign policy
away from an Anglo-American Atlanticist focus and began to look towards Europe.132
The biggest challenge for Boland and the Department of External Affairs came
in 1947, when Boland led the department at Paris during the multilateral negotiations
that would prepare a joint plan for the economic reconstruction of the European
continent. The Paris conference would be Ireland’s first involvement in postwar
multilateral diplomacy and it would be one of the key events of the Marshall Plan. It
also marked a turning point in Irish diplomacy. Boland and his increasingly
technocratic department faced their first major challenge in the Marshall Plan—
multilateral European diplomacy.133
External Affairs not only played an important role in the diplomatic arena, but
also had to increasingly confront issues dealing with economic matters. In 1948, a
Department of External Affairs’ memo revealed the urgent need to organize and expand
the department’s role. The memo states “any inefficiency, delay or lack of attention in
dealing with ERP may have very serious results on our national economy.”134 The
Department of Finance did not value the emerging international systems of integration
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and economic ties because they were wary of displacing Anglo-Irish financial trade
with the sterling area with a new, possibly tenuous international economic system.
However, the Department of External Affairs was cautiously looking towards Europe
and utilized the negotiations within the Committee for European Economic Cooperation
(CEEC) and Marshall Plan aid as a way to determine and change Ireland’s economic
relations with Europe, the United States, and, effectively, the United Kingdom.
External Affairs’ involvement in the CEEC allowed the department to take over many
of the areas that the Department of Finance had previously controlled, thus affecting the
future and direction of Irish economic policy.135
The second major change in the Department of External Affairs was the
appointment of Seán MacBride as minister of the department. The change in
government in 1948 replaced de Valera with John A. Costello. Costello appointed
MacBride as minister. MacBride was a highly regarded lawyer, onetime chief of staff
of the IRA, and a “politician with some daring, though unorthodox, views on the
development of Ireland’s international position.”136 MacBride was influenced by the
troubled relationship between Ireland and the U.K. His father was executed after his
involvement in the Easter uprising of 1916. MacBride fought in the Anglo-Irish War,
the guerrilla war against the British fought between 1919 and 1921. MacBride was
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imprisoned for IRA activities on numerous occasions. MacBride founded the
republican and socialist party Clann na Poblachta in the hopes that it would replace
Fianna Fail as the majority party in Ireland. He was instrumental in his involvement in
the Republic of Ireland Act, which led to the official Declaration of the Republic of
Ireland in 1949. This act of independence solidified Ireland’s breaking away from the
United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth.
Despite the fact that MacBride was politically charged, his fervor regarding the
engagement of Ireland in European affairs was in tune with the rest of the Department
of External Affairs. MacBride established a separate ERP Section in External Affairs in
1948 and, under MacBride, the department as a whole increased and expanded from
five to seven divisions.137 The Information Division, headed by the famous Irish
government figure Conor Cruise O’Brien, was set up to influence international public
opinion about the issue of partition.138 The division would also work with the ERP and
the Cultural Relations Divisions to publicize Ireland and her foreign policy abroad. The
Information Division also implemented and carried out campaigns to publicize and
praise the ERP (in accordance with a bilateral treaty with the United States).139 ECA
worked with the information division and officers in each country to provide funding
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for the creation and distribution of ERP propaganda through press releases, posters,
photographs, newsreels, radio, film, and other media. MacBride utilized these media,
which were intended to promote ERP, in order to highlight the issue of the partition of
Northern Ireland. MacBride had experience in the creation of propaganda during his
political campaigns, and he used this knowledge to manipulate ERP propaganda to draw
attention to the partition of Ireland, which he believed was a political, cultural and
economic blow to the Republic of Ireland.
In addition to his passionate nationalism, Seán MacBride was also a dynamic
leader in the Department of External Affairs. He worked well with ECA officials in
leading the way for Ireland’s involvement in ERP. In a speech for the ECA Head of
Mission to Ireland Joseph Carrigan, MacBride admits the obstinate and conservative
nature of the Irish and, yet, reveals a pleasant working relationship with U.S. officials
like Carrigan. MacBride reveals that the Irish
are a conservative people who are not in particular anxious to move with
the times and that hate to be told what to do or how to do it. I, therefore,
had visions of squalls perturbing the placid life of our relations with the
United States of America. Far from such fears being realized I found, on
the contrary, that within a short space of time I had given to Joe Carrigan
full permission and encouragement to address as many public meetings
and gatherings as possible.140
However, MacBride was also a nationalist at heart and the issue of partition became the
centerpiece in his attempt to promote ERP. In an interview to the National News
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Service in 1950, MacBride begins the interview with Cold War rhetoric related to the
“struggle between democratic rule, on the one hand, and political dictatorship on the
other hand.”141 The rhetoric shifts to the discussion of democracy and the abuse of
democracy because of Britain’s partition of Northern Ireland. MacBride claims that
the partition of Ireland and the occupation of a portion of Ireland by
British forces against the will of the overwhelming majority of the Irish
people is a flagrant violation of the basis upon which democratic rule and
freedom depend. If it is permissible for Britain to claim jurisdiction over
and to occupy a portion of our country, and therein to set up and support
an administration against the will of the overwhelming majority of the
Irish people, why does it become a heinous offence when Russia or
Germany does likewise in Europe.142
While MacBride did have some success in the European sphere, his continual
attempt to make the issue of partition and the ending of partition a condition for Irish
membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became an annoyance
to U.S. and European officials. This unfortunately backfired on him and the department
because he overestimated Ireland’s importance to the Americans and the British. Irish
membership in NATO was not a major factor in the United States and Britain’s
perception of international security.143 This exclusion of Ireland in NATO underscored
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the still relative unimportance of Ireland with regard to the “big players” of the United
States and Britain. The Treaty of Brussels in 1948, a precursor to NATO, was
established by the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries in order to
provide a united defense against the encroachment of communism. These countries
eventually included the United States because they needed its military prowess for
defense. Since the establishment of NATO was both a European and, in particular, a
British initiative, and therefore, the exclusion of Ireland revealed not only the peripheral
importance of Ireland to the U.S. and Britain, but also the tense relationship between
Britain and Ireland. Ireland’s fear was not limited to wariness of U.S. empire building,
but they were also skeptical of British intentions.
The Irish government and the Department of External Affairs had to figure out
a way to work with U.S. and yet, sustain independence. Some conservative leaders, like
de Valera wanted political and economic isolation for Ireland—this policy contrasted
with ERP goals of integration and intercontinental trade and tariff relief. Irish leaders
also had to discern how to publicize the problem of partition without alienating the
United States and Great Britain. The issue of Irish nationalism emerges in ERP
propaganda such as the film The Promise of Barty O’Brien, discussed in chapter two,
but leaders like MacBride also injected issue of partition in other propaganda media,
which will be discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
Propaganda and Politics: Partition, Nationalism and ERP
Many ECA officials, including Hoffman, believed the United States had an
important responsibility in distributing propaganda explaining its position as the leader
of the free world. However, ECA officials were uncomfortable with the word
propaganda. Propaganda often had (and has) a negative connotation. The U.S.
Congress was particularly reluctant to use the word propaganda since it was such an
effective tool of coercion used by both Mussolini and Hitler in establishing totalitarian,
fascist regimes before the outbreak of World War II. This hesitance to use propaganda
changed when a group of United States senators visited Europe in late 1947. They were
dismayed and overwhelmed by the power of Soviet propaganda, which was seen as yet
another threat in the Cold War.144 U.S. officials recognized that they had to utilize their
own propaganda to stymie the flood of Soviet ideology in the free world. However, in
lieu of using the word “propaganda,” U.S. officials used the word “information” instead
as a comfortable term for the distribution of information regarding the Marshall Plan.
But the overarching purpose of ERP propaganda was to assuage European fears of
economic instability by demonstrating that Europe could recover from the economic
devastation of the last war by embracing democracy, capitalism, free trade, and
consumerism. According to an early ERP publicity campaign, which ran the slogan
“you too can be like us,” Europe’s economy would recover if it adopted U.S. ideals of
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democracy and free trade. This European adaptation of a U.S. model would counteract
any leanings towards the Soviet model. At least, this was the goal of ECA officials.
The bilateral Economic Cooperation Agreement authorized the use of
propaganda with the full support of each participating country’s signatures. Funds for
publicity and propaganda came “from the five percent cut which the ECA extracted
from each country’s counterpart fund along with the ECA’s own budget for the
purpose.”145 ECA worked with the information division and officers in each country to
create and distribute propaganda through press releases, posters, photographs,
newsreels, radio, film, and other media. European recovery propaganda was given
priority in France, Italy, and the German Bizone because of the raw economic and
unstable conditions after the war. Ireland was in the third tier of priority for
propaganda. The CIA did not consider the problem of communism in Ireland a serious
threat because they believed that Irish Catholicism would prevent infiltration by antireligious communists.146 Even though the U.S. government did not perceive Irish
citizens as a threat to democracy and capitalism, nonetheless the State Department in
the U.S. was concerned that the United States needed to be credited with Marshall aid
as a means to demonstrate the power and preference for the right side—democracy,
freedom, and capitalism. Secretary of External Affairs Boland agreed that the ERP
countries should be reminded from time to time that the United States is furnishing their
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aid.147
Until 1948, the State Department was in charge of the ERP and, subsequently
also in charge of publicity for the program. When ECA personnel finally arrived in
Dublin in 1948, they immediately began to tightly control publicity for ERP and ensure
that Irish officials were executing the information in a timely and efficient manner.
Since there was no official Information Division within the ECA mission in Dublin
because of the low threat of communism compared to countries like Italy, William H.
Taft was assigned the position of information officer until Clement R. Hoopes took over
in 1950. There was a tremendous amount of pressure placed on the Irish officials and
the ECA officials for Europeans to meet and fulfill their ERP obligations, particularly
with regard to publicity. The ECA needed to reassure the U.S. Congress that the aid
they voted for with regard to ERP funds was indeed being used in an efficient and
effective way. Congress and other U.S. officials also needed reassurance that the fight
for democracy, the perception of a strong, benevolent America was winning in the war
against communism.148
When Seán MacBride replaced Éamon de Valera as minister for External
Affairs in 1948, there was a major shift in the publicity campaign for the ERP because
MacBride wanted to promote the ERP and enthusiastically advocated promotion
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through propaganda media. Internal documents from the Department of Foreign Affairs
in Ireland in 1948 and 1949 reveal a push to publicize the ERP to the public. A letter
from the ECA information officer, Taft, indicated that the publicity of the ERP was
insufficient and the members of the External Affairs would “be expected to publicize
the programme in other ways.”149 ECA officials were worried that “as far as the public
was concerned, ECA has now lost its novelty and the natural tendency from now on (as
happens with all administrations) will be to carp and criticize.”150 Assistant Secretary
of External Affairs Con Cremin feared that ECA officials believed Ireland was not
doing enough to publicize the ERP to its people, so he and MacBride launched a new,
more “sophisticated, specialised, and targeted ERP information campaign.”151
MacBride, Cremin, and others began to focus on using new media to publicize
the ERP. In the memo regarding OEEC propaganda from the Department of External
Affairs in 1949, Irish officials discussed the reasons for implementing publicity. They
not only wanted to highlight the ERP to the Irish, but they were also interested in using
the publicity campaigns to further Ireland’s own agenda in competing with the British
and focusing on the issue of partition. Britain’s production of “Getting on Together,” a
publicity pamphlet, which extolled the virtues of Marshall Plan Aid created a sense of
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urgency among External Affairs’ officials to create their own successful propaganda
campaign. The pamphlet was widely praised by the ECA officials. The memo
describes how
Britain has issued a considerable amount of publicity and was very proud
of the production of “Getting on Together.” The proposal (of Sir
Stafford Cripps) to hold this exhibition was intended to enable Britain to
“show off” to other countries. This renders it all the more important that
publicity work should be undertaken without any delay.152
The urgency for Irish officials to create a competitive piece of propaganda increased
when the Council of Ministers in Paris held an exhibition of ERP publicity materials.
The Council urged all ERP country members to participate in the exhibition. Not to be
outdone by the British, the Department of External Affairs wanted to create a greater
piece than the critically acclaimed British work of “Getting on Together.” But more
than anything, they also wanted to take advantage of the publicity campaign by
highlighting the issue of partition. In the same memo, there is a discussion of a poster
campaign not only to praise the ERP but also to show how Ireland’s “economic problem
is increased by the partition of the industrial portion of the country from the rest.”153
MacBride consistently emphasized the problem of partition in ERP propaganda and
directly to the media. In an interview with the International News Service in 1950,
MacBride stated that
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in many respects the problems affecting Ireland’s economy are very
different from those affecting the economy of other nations, which have
participated in the Recovery Programme. We only gained control of our
own affairs, after our War of Independence, in 1921. Until then, for
reasons which are obvious, the development of our economy has been
stunted.154
Although the poster campaign would be used to compete with the productions of other
countries as a sort of advertisement of “Irish imagination and art,”155 the campaign
would also show how the partition of Northern Ireland hindered Ireland’s ability to
invigorate its economy and, subsequently, the European economy. MacBride was
concerned that Ireland would be overshadowed by Britain and in a memo in 1950 he
argues that the Irish officials “feel that we are entitled, despite Britain’s strength,
diplomacy and propaganda, to the friendly help and support of the democratic
nations.”156
The Department of the Taoiseach, the head of the Irish government led by John
Costello during this period, was also concerned with how the Department of External
Affairs would handle publicity. In 1949, there was a memorandum on the creation of
an official news agency that would present general information about Ireland to the
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world (and vice versa) and give special attention to the issue of partition. The
memorandum expressed concern that “direct propaganda would not be published by
newspapers, but carefully selected news items will be published.”157 The government
linked the problems with the economy directly to partition. Northern Ireland contained
the industrial section of the nation and the issue of partition heightened not only the
nationalist urge to retain all of the counties in Ireland in the Republic, but also the
impetus of the economists to retain the money-making industrial sector.
Irish and ECA officials utilized new media to publicize the ERP, including
radio. In 1949, a series of talks concerning the ERP occurred on Radio Eirann, the
public service broadcaster of Ireland. The talks were lead by Seán MacBride, Minister
for External Affairs, J.E. Carrigan, Chief of the ECA Mission to Ireland and W.H. Taft,
III, assistant to Carrigan and information officer. The talks were actually published that
year and placed into circulation with a forward by John A. Costello, Taoiseach of
Ireland. Costello, in his forward, discussed the importance of ERP aid despite the fact
that Ireland was small and seemingly insignificant in relation to other European
countries. He says
While there may be definite limits to the part Ireland can play in
influencing the international economy the improvement of our own
economic system is a matter largely within our power. The future
prosperity of Ireland, however, is dependent to a considerable extent on
the success of attempts now being made to restore the international
economy. Because of our small size as a nation we may not be a
determining influence in the success of these attempts, but through our
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participation in the plan for European Economic Co-operation, we are
enabled to play a not inconsiderable role in assisting them.158
Radio broadcasts allowed Costello, MacBride, and the ECA officials to convince the
Irish that ERP aid was necessary and vital to not only the prosperity of the Irish
economy, but also to the European—even world—community at large since all
economies were intertwined. Costello placed extra emphasis on the plight of the Irish
farmer when he discussed the problems of chronic under-investment and underemployment in Ireland. Costello said that these conditions are
the result of under-investment in the past, may have been partly caused
by the fact that the Irish farmer, unaided by State assistance, has been
incapable of providing himself with the capital necessary to improve
substantially the productivity of his land. It is a great campaign for the
elimination of these conditions of under-employment that the Irish
Government needs the aid which the bold and generous policy of the
American Republic has lent us.159
Costello advocated for the Irish farmer because farming was the single greatest
economic sector of Ireland at the time. The talks emphasized the dire situation of
Ireland’s economic conditions. While Carrigan and Taft discussed the importance of
ERP aid in relation to Ireland’s economic growth, Taft chose to emphasize how tourism
and efficient industries using high-quality raw materials and craftsmanship would bring
in dollars, and Carrigan emphasized how better research and education in agriculture
could increase production and, therefore, economic growth in Ireland. MacBride began
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the talks by discussing Europe’s economic problems because of the lack of a balance of
trade.
In these talks, MacBride discusses the industrialization of Europe since 1850.
He mentions the turning of the tide in industrialization between Europe and the United
States. As a colony of the British, the United States provided raw materials to the
industrial world and, later, became an industrial power itself. The industrialization of
the United States caused this “turn of the tide” by causing a dollar deficit in Europe due
to an imbalance of trade. Europeans were importing more than they were exporting and
this created the imbalance. The two world wars caused further chaos in the economy of
Europe because there was a shortage of supplies and raw materials in Europe.
MacBride states that some countries, including Ireland
overworked their soil and thereby reduced their productive capacity.
The absence of fertilisers, and feeding stuffs, over a period of years, may
take much longer to mend, in terms of livestock and crops, than a direct
hit on a factory by a bomb.160
MacBride stressed the importance of farming because it was such a vital aspect of the
Irish economy. The exhausted soil and antiquated farming techniques placed Ireland at
a disadvantage as an exporting company. The talks were broadcast to the public, but
MacBride and the other Irish officials were keenly aware that they were also appealing
to ECA officials in their publicity campaigns. If they could convince the ECA to invest
in the farming industry, it would revitalize Ireland’s economy.
In his second talk, MacBride discussed the problems of the interdependence of
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the Irish and British economies. Because Ireland belonged to the sterling area, most of
its financial dealings with the outside world occurred through London. This did not
present a problem until 1947 when the reserves of the sterling area began running out,
and it ceased to be convertible. Because of the depreciation of the purchasing power of
the pound sterling, Ireland was unable to import materials such as fertilizers, feeding
stuffs, and machinery. This had a serious effect on its productive capacity in farming
and, therefore, the export of foodstuffs to Europe and abroad. MacBride credits the
ECA and the ERP program for providing loans to the Irish government for the purchase
of these import items, which, in effect, would allow Ireland to become an exporting
nation again.161
In his last talk before the American ECA officials’ turn, MacBride placed
particular emphasis on the importance of land, labor, and capital in Ireland. MacBride
explained that, as a nation, Ireland’s first task must be the utilization “to the full of the
natural resources that God, by His providence, has placed at our disposal.”162 The goal,
MacBride said, is that every acre, every parcel of land in Ireland will be productive.
The Minister of Agriculture, Dillon was directly responsible for the operation of land
productivity in Ireland. Dillon is quoted by MacBride as stating that “our ultimate
objective is to secure the rehabilitation of every acre of arable land in Ireland so as to
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ensure that the men who work upon it will get a fair return for the work they do….”163
Although MacBride placed particular emphasis on the importance of land and the
cultivation of land, he ended his portion of the talks by explaining that he did not want
to deemphasize the importance of industrial development. He went on to explain that
the success of an industry depends on the availability of raw materials. MacBride
explained how Ireland needed to increase timber production, which would lead to
building numerous other industries for the creation of artificial silk, rayon, cellulose,
paper, cardboard, etc. MacBride also explained that there was a need for an increase in
the production of electrical power. He says that while waterpower is being explored,
plans have been adopted, and are being carried out, for the erection of
turf-burning generating stations in some of the bog areas. In that way, it
will be possible to convert our turf into electric current and to bring heat
and power thus generated to the points where it is required. This is by
far the most efficient and economic way of utilising our turn. I have
sought to give you an outline of the way in which Ireland can rehabilitate
herself economically and help Europe at the same time.164
The turf, or peat, historically has been an important resource in Ireland. When the peat
is cultivated from the bogs and dried out, it makes an excellent source of fuel. Even
though peat was used in Ireland at the time for fuel, MacBride advocated its cultivation
on an industrial scale and, in particular, as a source of industrial power. This move
towards electrification and mass production of peat is evident in the film The Promise of
Barty O’Brien, where Barty is evidently fascinated by the looming power plant and the
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efficiency of the machinery. Barty’s ultimate goal is to leave the farmhouse and retain a
job in electricity so that he can play a role in the electrification of Ireland, which will
ultimately lead to the industrialization of Ireland and improve the country’s economy by
allowing the production of materials, not just agriculture, for European intercontinental
trade. This push towards mass production was in accordance with the plans of the ECA
officials and the participating European countries. The ERP countries’ goal was to
mass-produce needed materials for the other European countries. Unlike the Soviet
Union, industrialization would exist in conjunction with free trade among ERP nations.
Ireland’s economy would benefit from the production of materials, but the European
economy would also improve. At least, that was the goal of the European Recovery
Plan.
When Clement R. Hoopes took over as information officer in 1950, he took
advantage of a wider range of communication media to publicize the ERP. In Ireland,
this new media would focus on the importance of the farming community since this was
the strongest economic sector in Ireland at the time. The importance of farming and the
increase in agriculture production with the use of new and more efficient machinery is
evident in media like The Promise of Barty O’Brien, where Barty’s father’s farm is
joined with another farm and the horse is replaced with a tractor. During this period,
the horse was the most prevalent “machine” on the farms of Ireland so in the push to
increase agricultural production, Irish leaders and ECA officials also demanded the
implementation of modern, efficient farming machinery to counteract the slow,
antiquated farming involving the horse and plow.
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Many ECA officials believed the farming community had been neglected in
publicity and information, despite the Radio Éireann talks and other public
documents.165 Carrigan used the radio again in 1950 to emphasize the importance of
research and education in agriculture in a program titled “What Marshall Aid is Doing
for the Irish Farmer.”166 Also in 1950, a concerted effort was made to target Irish
women and children through radio programs and art exhibitions. The publicity
campaign also targeted the Irish public through concert and musical performances.
The year 1950 also marked the outbreak of the Korean War, which caused a
change in the focus of ECA publicity. U.S. policy began to place the importance of
military needs over European economic reconstruction. However, U.S. policy and, in
particular, ECA publicity, still focused on the vulnerability of “free Europe.” In 1950,
the ECA Information Division in Paris recognized the changed circumstances due to the
war and communist threat to the free world. It produced an outline acknowledging the
change in focus of ECA:
(1) Marshall Aid and military assistance are good for you because they
give you—as Europeans—a fighting chance to make Europe strong
enough to discourage any aggression.
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(2) But—this strength can only be achieved through unity. As separate,
rival powers, the nations of Free Europe are weak, are dangerously
exposed.
(3) Productivity must increase because more food, more machines, more
of nearly everything is needed to make Europe so strong it will be
unassailable.167
The ECA publicity campaign continued to place a strong emphasis on productivity.
ECA officials relied on the Anglo-American Council on Productivity, the ERP
Technical Assistance Program and the ERP Productivity Program to increase European
production levels. The idea was that an economically strong Europe would fend off the
falling dominos of Communism. Free trade, foodstuffs, electrical power, and increase
in imports and exports would create a strong economy in Europe. In other words,
Europe would become like the United States—industrial, free traders, capitalistic, and
free.
In this latter stage of the ERP after 1950, film became the chosen media for the
dissemination of publicity and propaganda. Albert Hemsing recounts his experience in
the Film Unit in the Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television. Hemsing
dismisses the controversy over using propaganda to promote the ERP when he claims
that
It is almost pointless to quibble about what propaganda is. In today's
media-saturated environment ECA-MSA's information activities would
count as an exercise in public diplomacy, a term now regularly used by
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the US Information Agency to explain its mission, and even by the
Department of State.168
According to Hemsing, the propaganda films were merely tools of diplomacy and
served to highlight the different needs of the participating countries as well as the
generosity of U.S. support. Hemsing describes the films as having different purposes
and serving different countries. However, despite the variety of the types of films, he
divides them into seven categories: “straight forward reports on one or more ‘one
country’ aid projects intended for the citizens of that nation…films reporting to all the
ECA nations…European unity, free trade and international cooperation…anticommunist Cold War propaganda…productivity and technical assistance
themes…mutual security, i.e. strengthening NATO’s defenses…and films for American
television.”169 The fifth category of productivity and technical assistance applies to
films like The Promise of Barty O’Brien.
In his memoir, Hemsing recalls the generous funding and process of making a
film through the ECA. Hemsing worked in the Information Division at the ECA’s
headquarters in Europe from 1948 to 1955. The Information Division in Paris was
located across from the American Embassy by a park near the Avenue des Champs
Elysses. A film could be proposed in a couple of different ways. The mission chiefs
from each country receiving Marshall Aid could propose a film to support a local need
168
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or a major project. The Information Division chiefs would also propose films that
might be suited for general ECA nations. In fact, the Film Unit in Paris proposed many
of the films since the department was comprised of European filmmakers who had
experience and expertise in making films.170 Lothar Wolff, the first chief of the Film
Unit, described the working philosophy of the unit in 1951:
All of them [the films] were prepared for Europeans by Europeans.
European producers—numbering some of the world’s outstanding
documentary specialists—were allowed by their American supervisors in
ECA’s motion picture section to tell the Marshall Plan story in the style
most appreciated by their fellow Europeans…if their pace seems
somewhat slower than Americans are accustomed to, and if the
propaganda content seems perhaps too subtle, it should be remembered
that these techniques are considered most effective for transatlantic
audiences.”171
Wolff stressed that the films are not merely American propaganda films created for the
purposes of furthering American needs, but they are truly for Europeans by Europeans
as a way of promoting projects, aid, and defense. He implied that the European
audience was more culturally nuanced and sensitive than an American audience. This
demonstrates a European view that the Europeans are more cultured than the United
States. This cultural clash between the U.S. and Europe is evident in several areas of
the implementation of the ERP.
The Marshall Plan films were distributed in several different ways. Since
television barely existed in Europe, non-theatrical (16mm) film became the best vehicle
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for showing the films. The United States Information Service (USIS), a division of the
State Department, kept a film library at each American Embassy to allow for easy
access and distribution of the films to local ECA countries. Theatrical distribution was
also a popular way to distribute and screen the films since it could target larger groups
of people who could view the films at their local movie house.172 When the Marshall
Plan formally ended in 1952, the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) inherited the
Information Division and further utilized the propaganda machine for NATO and other
military purposes.173 Film became a valuable medium through which to publicize
American aid and contributions from the U.S. to ensure European security.
The propaganda films issued by the ECA demonstrate the Marshall Plan’s foray
into new media for the publicizing of American aid. However, The Promise of Barty
O’Brien, like other publicity campaigns by the ECA in Europe, further demonstrates
how these films were made for Europeans by Europeans. In the case of Barty, the film
was in many ways an Irish film made by the Irish for the Irish. The film The Promise of
Barty O’Brien and other media in Ireland were used to highlight and promote ERP. The
media show how Ireland was attempting to work with the United States to promote U.S.
aid and, at the same time, use the medium of propaganda to highlight the political
agenda of partition and play upon Irish nationalism. Although the film was not
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distributed to a wide audience, it strategically targeted Irish officials and U.S. ECA
officials.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusion: How Nationalism and Anti-partition
Prevented Ireland From Fully Benefiting From ERP
The story of Irish involvement in the Marshall Plan has never been fully
explained mainly because it transects the economic, social, political and
diplomatic history in the period 1947-1957….174
Ireland was neutral and partitioned when the Marshall Plan began, and
it remained so when the plan ended.175
Despite the efforts of the filmmakers of The Promise of Barty O’Brien and Irish
proponents of integration and modernization, such as O’Faolain and MacBride, Ireland
failed to reap the benefits of ERP aid and fully integrate with Europe after World War
II. A lack of industrialization, failing to break economic ties to the United Kingdom,
and making partition a condition of membership in NATO revealed the limitations of
Irish leaders’ attempts to enter the international political and economic arena. The
isolationist tendencies of many Irish officials reflected the conservative nature of the
Irish who preferred to isolate Ireland from the rest of Europe by relying on Ireland’s
conservative, agricultural, and nationalistic heritage. Irish leaders grappled with their
isolationist tendencies and nationalistic fervor, which often took precedence over
economic and cultural integration with the European continent. The European Recovery
Program provided an opportunity for Irish leaders to participate in world affairs, but the
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issue of partition continually alienated the superpowers. Although Irish leaders were
enthusiastic about participating in integration and welcoming cultural and economic
resources, Ireland ultimately failed to meet the expectations of modernization and
integration inherent in both the film the Promise of Barty O’Brien and the ERP’s goals.
While the ERP essentially ended Ireland’s self-imposed isolation because of
their neutrality during the war, Irish leaders were still resistant to European integration.
Ireland’s economic ties to Britain isolated Ireland from economic integration with
Europe. The issue of partition prevented Ireland’s inclusion in NATO and frustrated
ECA officials’ attempts to implement ERP. Although Ireland did experience a
Europeanization of Irish policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the impediment of
political and economic nationalism prevented international cooperation in these early
years after the war. Ireland would eventually pursue integration with Europe in the form
of the European Community and is currently a member of the European Union.
The problem of nationalism and the partition of Northern Ireland prevented the kind of
electrification and industrialization envisioned in The Promise of Barty O’Brien.
Northern Ireland contained the largest industrial area of Ireland, but that connection to
industrialization was lost after partition. The Department of External Affairs and
individuals like F.H. Boland and Seán MacBride were pivotal in working with the ERP
towards a new vision of Ireland and European cooperation, but the Department of
Finance and nationalistic organizations like the Irish Workers’ League compromised
their efforts. In addition, Irish leaders continued to make partition a political issue when
discussing and promoting ERP. Even though MacBride increased and expanded the
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Department of External Affairs from five to seven divisions and created the Information
Division to influence international public opinion about Ireland and the ERP, his
continual attempt to make the issue of partition a condition for Irish membership in
NATO led to Ireland’s loss of important economic aid that would have increased
electrification, agriculture production, and industrialization.
ERP officials wanted to increase manufacturing, wage labor, income levels, and
occupational diversification. Irish leaders in the Department of External Affairs
emphasized the importance of industrialization because the Irish economy relied heavily
on agriculture, but the dysfunctional codependence of the British and Irish economy and
the conservative economic and political nationalism of Irish leaders prevented economic
integration with the continent and forced the continuance of economic, and conversely
political, isolation from the rest of the world. The issue of partition prevented Ireland’s
entrance into NATO. This not only cost Ireland the remaining money for technical
assistance and potential grants, it also demonstrated a failed opportunity to work within
the international arena and show that a small, seemingly peripheral nation could
participate in international decisions and even defense.
Irish leaders and the Department of External Affairs took advantage of the
ERP publicity campaign in order to highlight the issue of partition. ERP officials
pressured the Information Division to utilize funds specifically to publicize the
importance of ERP and American generosity, but MacBride and other Irish officials
actively used these resources to highlight the problem of partition and use the forum of
newspapers, radio and film to argue against partition. Rather than pleasing the ERP
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officials, this proved to be another annoyance to U.S. leaders who had invested a great
deal of money in the ERP propaganda campaign. In radio broadcasts, Irish officials
linked the problems of the economy directly to partition. Northern Ireland contained
the industrial section of the nation and the issue of partition heightened not only the
nationalist urge to retain all of the counties in Ireland in the Republic, but also the
impetus of the economists to retain the money-making industrial sector. Irish leaders
tried to work with the United States to promote U.S. aid and, at the same time, use the
medium of propaganda to highlight the political agenda of partition and play upon Irish
nationalism.
Although Irish leaders and individuals alienated U.S. officials because of the
partition issue, the cultural exchange, and fear of cultural exchange, further complicated
the relationship between the United States and Ireland. Many were critical of
“American Exceptionalism” and the idea that American culture was far superior to
European culture. Europeans often equated American culture with being materialistic,
mass-produced, and without heart. While Americans valued popular culture, the Irish,
particularly the artists, viewed any medium which they considered popular culture to be
antithetical to high culture and against what the Irish are about—a long history of “high
art” representation of Irish culture through literature: stories and poetry.
Sean O’Faolain’s writing was characteristic of a kind of ambivalence regarding
the Irish high culture. While O’Faolain attacked the Irish romanticism of the country’s
agrarian past and the sensibility that Ireland was distinct, special, and spiritually more
exalted than the rest of the world, he ironically portrays the agrarian romanticism and
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the importance of nationalism in The Promise of Barty O’Brien. The film publicizes the
importance of ERP, technical assistance, electrification and industrialization. However,
it also glorifies and romanticizes the rural Irish peasant in O’Faolain’s treatment of
Barty’s family and their humble farm and perpetuates Irish nationalism through several
references to the Easter Rebellion, which appeal to the Irish nationalist.
O’Faolain and Ireland’s continued obsession with nationalism reflects the
difficulty of the Irish people and Irish officials in the Department of External Affairs to
work with ERP officials and European officials without making the issue of
nationalism, specifically partition, a condition in negotiating international affairs.
Despite Irish nationalism and resistance to outside cultural, political, and economic
influence, many Irish officials actively courted external political and cultural influences,
but Ireland ultimately failed to meet the expectation of modernization inherent in both
the film The Promise of Barty O’Brien and the ERP’s goals. Ireland was in a unique
position during this postwar, new world order. Despite neutrality during World War II,
political, and economic isolation, and antagonism towards U.S. intentions, Ireland
became a part of the European Recovery Plan and actively tried to work with Europe
while also attempting to figure out their identity as a post-colonial, newly-independent
(albeit partitioned) nation. But the issue of extreme nationalism and partition prevented
Ireland from fully benefiting from ERP in the immediate years after the war. Economic
nationalism and isolation forced a mass emigration of the Irish people to the United
Kingdom, the United States and elsewhere. Ireland did not actively pursue integration
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until the 1960s and 1970s, when Ireland finally joined the European Community (EC)
in 1973.176
The Promise of Barty O’Brien provides some context for illustrating the
ambiguous relationships of the U.S. and Ireland, nationalism and a move toward
industrializing a country that was very much still mired in the nineteenth century. But
it is this very temporal displacement, this living in the past, and this romanticizing of an
agrarian lifestyle that prevented Ireland from emerging fully from isolation and
impeded industrialization. After all the efforts of MacBride and the Department of
External Affairs to use the ERP to confront the issue of partition, Ireland was neutral
and partitioned when the Marshall Plan began, and it remained so when the plan ended.
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